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It is commonly observed that over time and across societies, women tend
to marry older men. The traditional explanation for this phenomenon is that
wages increase with age and hence older men are more attractive in the marriage
market. The model developed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that a
marriage market equilibrium where women marry earlier in life than men can
be achieved without making any assumptions about the wage process or gender
roles. The only driving force in this model is the asymmetry in fecundity horizons
between men and women. When the model is calibrated with Census Data, the
average age at first marriage and the pattern of the sex ratio of single men to
single women over different age groups mimics the patterns observed in developed
countries during the last decade.
Chapter 3 extends the model in order to analyze assortative mating. In this
case people belong to one of two groups and prefer to marry someone within the
group. In this chapter it is shown that, given constant preferences, the limited
horizon for searching for a mate affects the likelihood of intermarriage through
ages, and the dynamic is different for men and women.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study and uses 1970 and 1980 US Census data to
study how the local sex ratios of single men to single women affect several aspects
of the marriage market. Unlike earlier literature, this work also investigates other
margins over which individuals can substitute in the marriage market - specifically
the choice of spouse’s characteristics. These new results suggest that a shortage
of single men leads women (and also men) to marry earlier. This suggests a more
elastic response for women to a tight marriage market than the one for men.
This is consistent with a marriage model where the search horizon for women is
shorter than the one for men, as the one developed in the previous chapters. The
results also suggest that an adverse change in the sex ratio can lead both men
and women to marry outside of their own racial or educational group.
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It is commonly observed that, over time and across societies, women tend to
marry older men. In the economics literature, the conventional explanation is
that wages rise with age and hence men, who are the breadwinners in special-
ized families, are more attractive to women at older ages. Knowing this, young
men will wait for the better marriage opportunities that come along with higher
salaries at older ages. Historically this rationale played a role. For most of human
history gender specialization in marriage was strong and many models rightfully
reflected this strong historical specialization (e.g. Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993).1
However, with the tremendous rise in the labor force participation of women over
the last four decades and the increasing fraction of families in which women earn
more than men, the compelling nature of the conventional economic argument
begins to break down.
If the conventional economic argument was the only explanation, the rise in
women’s economic independence should have relaxed the necessity of younger
women marrying older men. In fact, between 1960 and 1990, female labor force
1Ted Bergstrom (1996) recognizes this fact when referring to his own theoretical model of
marriage (Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993)).
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participation rose from approximately 35% to approximately 60% (leveling off in
the 1990’s). During this time the wage gap (adjusting for skills) between women
and men declined. Moreover, by the 1990s more than one-third of dual income
families had women earning more than men.2 However, the age difference at
marriage between men and women barely moved. According to the US Census,
the difference in the median age between men and women at first marriage was
2.5 years in 1960. Thirty years later, in spite of tremendous social changes the
difference in the median age at first marriage between men and women was still
2.3 years.
The important changes in gender roles observed in the last decades occurred
along side a delay of marriage for both sexes rather than a decrease in the age
difference at first marriage between men and women. This is inconsistent with the
purest version of the conventional economic model and is one reason to revisit our
marriage models. A second reason is that, even when women specialized in home
production, the economic model may not have been as important as has been
suggested. For example, the common occurrence of a young woman marrying
her high school sweetheart who is two years older, seems hard to explain using a
purely "gains-from-trade type" argument. With wages continuing to rise steeply
with age among the young it is reasonable that even more gains to trade could
occur if women married even older men. Finally, from a theoretical point of view,
these models implicitly assume the myopia of women, imperfect capital markets
or imperfect information about men’s ability. It seems desirable to understand




A handful of recent studies investigate a second potentially important factor
leading younger women to marry older men - biology. It is a biological fact
that women are fertile for less of their lives than are men. The consequence of
this asymmetry in the fecundity horizons is that there will always be more fertile
men than fertile women at any given point in time. Thinking of this imbalance as
relative scarcity implies more bargaining power for the sex in short supply (in this
case women) and competition among agents for the sex in abundant supply (in
this case males). When this is true, one way that men may compete for women
is through the resources they can bring to the marriage. When this insight
is added to the upward sloping profile of wages with age, men may rationally
wait to marry to compete better with younger men. (Siow (1998)). While this
argument incorporates biology in a serious way, it is the age-wage profile that
remains the underlying driving force of the market equilibrium. Biology, in this
case, is simply the reason that justifies women as the scarce resource and justifies
women choosing among men according to what they bring to the marriage and
receiving the rent from their scarcity. One question that has not been addressed
is whether the scarcity of fertile women arises in a world where individuals have
rational expectations and are fully aware of the asymmetry between men and
women that Siow describes.
The point of departure for this dissertation is exactly this question: How does
the equilibrium in the marriage market look when both men and women behave
optimally and recognize that men have more time than women to search for the
right mate and still have children? Therefore, the main objective through the
following chapters will be to study how this differences in horizons affect marital
behavior in general and how this behavior can change over ages.
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Even assuming that asymmetric fecundity horizons play an important role
in marriage market behavior, it remains unclear which aspects of the marriage
market equilibrium are due to biology itself and which depend on a wage process
where wages rise with age. The objective of the model developed in the follow-
ing chapters of this dissertation is limited to addressing the question: What can
be explained exclusively by biology? Another reason for isolating the effects of
biology independent of the wage processes is that while the latter varies consider-
ably across societies, biology varies very little. Therefore, any prediction gleaned
from a model that does not rely on upward sloping wage profiles is likely more
applicable in a variety of social contexts. Furthermore, this framework does not
need any additional assumptions about the perception of future earnings.
The model developed in Chapter 2 is a two-sided general equilibrium search
model where (as in most of the labor-related search literature) men and women
are ex ante homogenous and utility is non-transferable.3 Only after a random
meeting do the man and the woman receive signals about the match quality
(match-specific heterogeneity). The purpose of the paper is to analyze how the
agents’ behavior and opportunity sets are affected by the asymmetry in the fe-
cundity and (in the generalized version of this model) life horizons. Therefore,
the age heterogeneity will be the crucial element here.4 In this model utility
depends both on the quality of the match and on the joy derived from having
3Using non-transferable utility is helpful in order to provide a framework that is able to
explain stylized facts about marriage independently of the potential gains of specialization, as
it is common in the literature.
4There is an increasing theoretical literature about ex ante heterogeneous agents (for example
Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2002).
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children within marriage5. Unlike most of the previous marriage market liter-
ature, neither employment decisions nor capital accumulation is analyzed here.
The total number of single men and women, and therefore the sex ratio, is de-
termined endogenously in the model. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first attempt in the economic literature to analyze age heterogeneity in a search-
matching framework.
One of the major findings in Chapter 2 is that biology alone can provide an
alternative explanation of the age difference between men and women at first
marriage. Here, biology has two countervailing effects. First, as in Siow (1998),
when women are young both older men and younger men compete for them
making them scarce and hence raising the minimum acceptable match quality
for marriage. By itself this would tend to make women marry at ages older
than men. But offsetting this, forward-looking women, who know about their
shorter fecundity horizon, reduce their optimal reservation value. The net result
for reasonable parameter values is that, at most ages, women set an optimal
reservation value that is relatively lower than the one a man of the same age sets.
Therefore, women marry relatively younger than men because the biological clock
induces them to accept a lower match quality even in the face of their relative
scarcity at a given point in time. That result differs substantially from previous
literature where relatively scarce fertile women are able to choose from a larger
set of fertile men who "compete" for them. In addition, using the generalized
version of the model, solved numerically, this work is able to quantify the age
difference in marriage, the age composition of single males and females and the
5The underlying assumption here is that people derive more utility from having biological
children than from either having them out of wedlock or through adoption.
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pattern of the sex ratio of singles along the life cycle. One of the features of these
results is that a relatively large difference in the fecundity horizon (say, 20 years)
leads to an age difference at first marriage that is much smaller (1.5 years). These
results are then compared with micro census data for the US and other selected
countries, from 1960 to 2000.
Chapter 3 extends the work of Chapter 2 to analyze assortative mating. In this
case people belong to one of two groups and prefer to marry to someone within
the group. In this chapter is shown that, given constant preferences, the limited
horizon for searching for a mate affects the likelihood of intermarriage through
ages, and the dynamic is different for men and women. Assuming a proportional
discount in utility for marrying someone of the other group, this barrier decreases
with time as reservation values of men and women do. Therefore the model
implies that the fraction of intermarriage increases with age.6 Moreover, the
model suggests women tend to increase the rate of intergroup marriage relatively
to men right before fecundity starts to decline. Assuming, as before, random
matching, one crucial element here will be the relative size of the two groups,
issue extensively discussed in the Sociology literature specially after the work of
Blau (1977).7 Here the model suggests that, due to increasing search frictions,
the smaller the size of the group, the higher the rate of intermarriage, the lower
the marriage rate and the older the age of marriage. All the implications of the
model are then compared with US data.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study and uses 1970 and 1980 US Census data to
6Kalmijn (1993) notices that late marriers are more likely to intermarry than people who
marry young.
7As Blau (1977) states "...in the relation between any two groups, the rate of intergroup
associations of the smaller group exceeds that of the larger."
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study how the local sex ratios of single men to single women affect several aspects
of the marriage market. It begins by addressing how a shortage of “marriageable
men” changes the rate and timing of marriage. Unlike earlier literature, this
work also investigates other margins over which individuals can substitute in
the marriage market - specifically the choice of spouse’s characteristics. In this
paper, the sex ratio is defined as the ratio of single men over single women in the
same geographical area, belonging to the same ethnic/educational group. The
empirical approach is similar to that in Angrist (2002) analyzing the effects of
sex imbalances over the behavior of the children of immigrants. Unlike previous
empirical results (e.g. Brien (1997)), the results of the empirical study of Chapter
4 suggest that a shortage of single men leads women (and also men) to marry
earlier. This result suggests that the behavior of men and women respect to
the timing of marriage is not driven only by the direct effect of the availability
of partners but also by the reaction of the rest of the market to a given sex
imbalance In addition, the result may imply a more elastic response for women
to a tight marriage market than the one for men.
Chapter 5 is a conclusion.
Literature Review
Since the publication of Gary Becker’s first paper on marriage (Becker 1973)
there has been growing interest in investigating decisions about marriage as if
they occurred in a market. Becker argues that marriage has many aspects that
are similar to trade of any other good in a market. Marriage is a voluntary
contract between two people, or two families, who believe that they will be better
off married than remaining single. Further, like buyers and sellers, many men
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and women compete to find mates. These aspects make marriage amenable to
investigation as voluntary trade in a competitive market.
The compelling logic of this argument has spawned a large volume of research
in both economics and sociology of both a theoretical and empirical nature. Much
of the early literature followed up on Becker’s insight and thought about one
person, usually the woman, "purchasing" a mate in the marriage market. In this
literature, women made decisions on marriage based on "meeting" men from the
available pool and choosing whether to marry them or remain single. Men were
passive agents and the bilateral nature of the marriage market was ignored. Heer
and Grossbard-Shechtman (1981) outlined the idea of a negative relationship
between the marriage squeeze for women and the proportion of women able to
choose husbands with (1) high income and (2) a high inclination toward having
children.
The spatial dimension of marriage market, and the effects of "local sex ratios"
was analyzed by Lichter (1991), where local marriage markets are defined over
382 data of Labor Market Areas. As most part of the empirical literature of the
subject, his analysis is based in prevalence marriage rates. Another study by
South and Lloyd (1992), analyze incidence rates in the 50 states, using annual
statistics for marriages and divorces.
While these models were perhaps unrealistic in construct, they have had a
major impact on the literature and on public policy. One well cited example
is the work of Wilson and Neckerman (1986) who argue that the rise in out-of-
wedlock childbearing among African-Americans is primarily a result of African-
American women increasingly choosing not to marry from a shrinking pool of
African-American men as they are deemed to be of insufficient quality to be
8
"marriageable" (i.e. close to the women’s age and education level, not in prison
and employed). In the last decade, several empirical studies contrast this hy-
pothesis with data, like Wood (1995) and its implications, for example in teen
childbearing crime, as in Barber (2001).
Investigating this theory, Brien (1997) finds that while the pool of marriage-
able men does affect the age at first marriage, this mechanism explains very
little of the difference in the timing of marriage (and fertility) between African-
Americans and Whites. Other empirical examples where women are seen as
choosing from a pool of available men include Fitzgerald (1991), Lichter et al.
(1992), Wood (1995) and Schmidt (2002).
While empirical work has largely ignored the bilateral nature of marriage,
theoretical work has had a rich tradition of investigating marriage as a bilateral
process (either in a stable matching context (i.e. Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)), or a dynamic search context (i.e. Mortensen (1988)).8
Most of the literature views utility of marriage arising solely from the qual-
ity of the match between the husband and the wife.9 However, clearly one of
the main reasons that marriage occurs is for the production of children. While
more recently, bearing children outside of marriage has become more common in
developed countries, there are still reasons to believe that it is less costly, or of
higher utility for parents to raise a child within marriage. For example, Willis
and Weiss (1993) argue that children are a public good within marriage and as
such both parents can derive utility from the child at the same time while sharing
8For detailed surveys about the search and matching literature, see Burdett and Coles (1999)
and also Pissarides (2000)
9An exception is Siow (1998).
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the cost of raising the child. This advantage is lost when a child’s time needs to
be divided between a custodial and non-custodial parent outside of marriage. In
a real sense, the distinction of utility arising both from the marriage itself as well
as from the children produced by it is unimportant when the marriage market
is viewed as static (as the utility from the marriage can simply be redefined as
the marriage’s intrinsic value plus the expected utility from children produced
from it at the time of marriage). But as we discuss below, when men and women
are forward looking, and when fecundity falls with age, this distinction becomes
important.
Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) present a model with incomplete information
where men who expect to be successful delay marriage until they are able to give
a signal that allows them to attract more desirable women. The equilibrium of
this model is that, while all women marry early in life, the most desirable women
marry successful older men and the less desirable women marry young men who
do not expect to prosper.
The interaction between marriage, labor market and human capital accumu-
lation has also been addressed in the literature. Recent examples are Aiyagari
et al. (2000), Seitz (2002) and Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2002). Also,
in a recent paper, Brien, Lillard and Stern (2002) analyze cohabitation before
marriage as a learning process about match quality.
Also in the last few years a growing theoretical literature on assortative match-
ing has shed light on some of the issues raised by Becker’s pioneering work, for
example Shimer and Smith (2000) and Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2001).
Even though most of this literature is focused in assortative mating by education
and income, the issue of interracial marriage has also been studied recently, for
10
example by Wong (2003).
As noted above, Siow (1998) introduced the issue of the shorter fecundity
period of women.10 In a model with capital accumulation and where utility comes
exclusively from having children, old and young men (all fertile) compete for
young women as by assumption infertile women do not participate in the market.
Young men would always marry young women except that Siow allows wages
to rise with age as well. Because of this some old men, those who successfully
obtain a higher wage, are able to marry. This displaces some of the young men in
the competition over scarce fertile women. Moreover, Siow argues that there is a
relationship between the scarcity of fertile women and the fact that men are more
likely to remarry after divorce.11 While it is hard to argue that, at any point of
time, the stock of single fertile women is smaller than the stock of single fertile
men, it is not clear whether this will be true in a dynamic framework. What
this paper shows is that a market with more single men than women could be
the equilibrium outcome where women, aware of their relatively limited fecundity
horizon reduce their reservation value over the quality of a mate in order to ensure
they marry when they are still in their fertile period.
10Tertilt (2002) uses a similar frameworrk to analyze the effects of polyginy.
11As Siow(1998) states in the introduction (pg. 335) ”First, in monogamous societies with
divorce and remarriage, fecund women are relatively scarce. For example, in North America,
at least 30 percent of first marriages fail. Twenty percent of divorced women and 60 percent
of divorced men will remarry. This differential in remarriage rates suggest that 12 percent of
women who marry for the first time will marry divorced men. There are at least 12 percent
fewer never-married to match with never-married men. Women will behave differently than
men in response to this relative scarcity.”
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Chapter 2
A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity
2.1 A Simple 2-period Model
In this section we develop a simple overlapping generations model where people
live two periods, women are fertile only in the first period and men are fertile
in both periods. This simplification will allow us to obtain closed form solutions
of the strategies and to prove existence and uniqueness. In the next section we
will generalize this model allowing people to live a larger number of periods, and
where the fecundity horizon for women is shorter than the one for men. The
numerical solution for the generalized model is then compared with census data.
2.1.1 Assumptions
There is a continuum of single women of measure F (t), and of men, M(t). We
will focus on the steady state, so F (t) = F and M(t) =M.
In the spirit of Pissarides (1990), the number of contacts between single women
and men is determined by a constant return to scale meeting function, as follows
η = µMθF 1−θ (2.1)
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where 0 < θ < 1 and µ a constant lower than 1.1
Women will meet at most one man per period and vice versa. The probability
of meeting someone of the opposite sex each period will depend the relative
scarcity of each sex. For that reason, the probability that a single woman meets




















where S is the ratio single men/single women (sex ratio).
All singles are ex-ante homogeneous except for their (observable) age and
potential fecundity. The preferences over the opposite sex are idiosyncratic. As
stated above, this paper focuses in how time affects marriage behavior; therefore
this assumption, along with the one of random matching, are for simplicity and
does not affect generality.
Men and women differ in potential fecundity by age. While men are fertile at
all ages, women are only fertile at age 1.
Both men and women live two periods, ages 1 (young) and 2 (old) . At any
moment, there will be a number of women from both generations, f1 of age 1
and f2 of age 2 looking for a husband. Similarly these women will face a market
of m1 (young) and m2 (old) bachelors.
Since men and women get married in pairs we need the number of young and
old women that get married each period (w1 and w2) to be equal to the total of
1This constant is merely a time scaling parameter introduced to ensure that the probability
of meeting is lower than 1 and to allow a replication of the model in an arbitrary number of
periods.
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men (h1 young plus h2 old) who enter into marriage. That is:
w1 + w2 = h1 + h2
Each period, an exogenous flow of single young people of age 1, f1 women
and m1 men (we assume m1 = f1) enter the market.2 The men and women who
have not married in the previous period will remain in the market. In the steady
state, this flow of young people entering the market will be equal to the number
of people who exit the market through marriage at any age plus the number that
die single after period 2 ( f s women and ms men).3. That is,
f1 = w1 + w2 + f
s
m1 = h1 + h2 +m
s
Since the motivations of an eventual divorce and remarriage could be very
different that the ones for first marriage, this topic is not investigated in this
paper.4 We assume that people who divorce or whose spouse die do not re-enter
the market. The meaning of this assumption is that, when single, people plan
to marry only once in life. In other words, that at the moment people decide to
marry the first time they believe that their marriage will last for the rest of their
lives.
2As in Burdett and Coles (1997).
3Here we implicitly assume that the actual number of children that people have is the
quantity needed to ensure the steady state with no population growth. Since the goal of this
paper is to explain only the decision of marriage we assume the decision about the number of
children as exogenous.
4For a model of marriage with "on the job" search and therefore endogenous separations,
see Cornelius (2003)
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The stock of single female of each age will be
f2 = f1 − w1
f s = f2 − w2
F = f1 + f2
Similarly, the stock of single men of each age will be
m2 = m1 − h1
ms = m2 − h2
M = m1 +m2
The discount factor is equal to β ∈ (0, 1)
The age composition of the marriage market is endogenously determined in








are simultaneously determined as a function of the reservation strategies of men
and women.
2.1.2 Payoffs
Given that a man and a woman meet, their potential payoffs come from mutual
compatibility and the utility of having children within marriage. We assume that
both men and women will receive zero utility if they do not marry either in period
one or two.
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The specific utility that a woman receives from a man and vice versa are con-
sidered as independent random draws from the distribution Gm (y) and Gf (x) ,
respectively. Assume that Gm (y) has support [0, ymax] and mean y, and Gf (x)
has support [0, xmax] and mean x.5 Both distributions are strictly increasing on
x and y respectively.
In addition, if a fertile man and a fertile woman meet, the utility is increased
by a multiplicative parameter k > 1 because of the possibility of having children
together. For example, if a fertile man marries a fertile woman he will receive kx
per period and she will receive ky per period. If either the man or the woman
involved is infertile, both of them will only receive x or y respectively, that is,
only the love of the other person.
The rationale for the parameter k is that the value of a "having a family"
will be a function of the attraction to their significant other. That is, people
enjoy having children more with a person they care about. If we assume that
people always receive utility from having children, we can separate it into two
components, one coming from parenthood, and the other component coming
from who the agent are having children with. Since it is possible to have children
without a stable relationship, the specific joy of having children (and thus the
utility out-of-wedlock parenthood) is normalized to 0 in this model. We assume
further that the multiplicative parameter k has a maximum such that the utility
5In theory, y or x could take on negative values if the mean of both distributions were
strictly positive. It sounds perfectly plausible that any man or woman could find that marrying
certain canditates to be worse than staying single, and having children with these potential
mates as a discount over having them out of wedlock. However, since the utility of being single
is equal to 0, the reservation values set by men and women will be always nonnegative and that
assumption will become irrelevant.
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of marrying and have children with an average person can not be higher than the
joy of finding a perfect match. That is,
kx ≤ xmax and ky ≤ ymax (2.5)
Thus, the payoffs of marriage for men and women are the following:
Women Husband Age 1 Husband Age 2
Marry at age 1 ky (1 + β) ky
Marry at age 2 y
Men Wife Age 1 Wife Age 2
Marry at age 1 kx (1 + β) x
Marry at age 2 kx x
2.1.3 The Man’s Optimization Problem
Probability of a Marriage Offer for Men
Let us first analyze the Male Problem.6 In each period a man will meet a woman
with probability ηm (by Equation (2.3)). The man will meet a single young woman
with probability p . This probability is equal to f1
F
(the fraction of single women
who are young), and this fraction (while endogenous to the market) is exogenous
to each individual. However, the fact that he meets a young woman does not
mean that he has a concrete opportunity to marry her. Even though all men are
fertile, a given young woman will not be indifferent between a man of age 1 and
of age 2, because if she marries a senior bachelor she will enjoy his company for
6Unless note otherwise I use the term man and woman in this Section to refer to single man
and single woman.
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only one period. Hence she will set two different reservation values, Rf (i, j) for
young men and Rfold for men of age 2. In other words, a senior bachelor will have
a probability of a marriage offer from a young woman (that is, to meet and also




















Since old women will have reservation utility equal to 0 , they will accept any
proposal. Then the probability that a given male receives and offer from an old
woman will be
αold = ηm (1− p)
Given that a marriage offer is available, the man receives a signal drawn from
the distribution Gf(x) and decide to marry or not.
Utility of Marriage for Men of Age 2 (Old)
Old men who do not marry will die single, earning zero utility. The reservation
value for an old man is therefore equal to 0. He would be willing to marry any
woman who makes him a marriage offer. If he meets a woman age 2 (who also
has a reservation utility equal to 0), they will marry with certainty. If he meets
a young woman (age 1) and he marries her, he will enjoy the extra utility from
the prospect of having children (k times the type of the woman).










Utility of Marriage for Men of Age 1 (Young)
Since young men are able to wait until they are old in order to find the right
mate, in period 1 men set a reservation value for accepting a woman taking into
account next period prospects. As before, they can meet young or old women. Of
course, if a young man marry a young woman, he will enjoy having children and
live with his wife for two periods. If he marries an old woman he will be married
for only one period and without children. Consequently, the reservation values of
match quality a young man will set for marrying a young or an old woman will
not be the same. Call these two reservation values Rm (j, i)and Rmold, respectively.
Moreover, in order to marry a young woman, he has to be accepted by her. This






. The utility that a man derives
from marrying at period 1 is then
Um1 = α
young








Optimization Problem for Young Men
The problem that a young man faces is to choose to marry or not in order to
maximize




1 (1−Gf (Rm (j, i))) + αold (1−Gf (Rmold)) (2.7)
is the probability that a man marries at age 1 with a young or an old woman.
The Bellman Equation of this Problem is
V m1 =Max
Dm




⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if x ≥ R
m (j, i) or x ≥ Rmold
0 otherwise
where Dm is the decision of marrying at at age 1.
The reservation value set for an old woman is exactly equal to the discounted
value that a man has if remains in the market at age 2. Notice that, the to the
linearity assumed in the utility function, the reservation value that men set for
older women is k(1+β) times the reservation value for young women. The reason
for this is if he marries an old woman he will live with his wife only one period
and without children. That is,
Rmold = βV
m
2 = k(1 + β)R
m
2.1.4 The Woman’s Optimization Problem
Probability of a Marriage Offer for Women
Now we can analyze the female problem. In each period , given the probability
of meeting rate ηf (by Equation (2.2)), a given woman will meet a young man
with probability q and an old man with probability (1− q) . She will marry him
if the utility of marrying the man she meets, drawn from the distribution Gm(y)
is greater than the value of search for a better mate for one more period.
Utility of Marriage for Women of Age 2 (Old)
A woman is age 2 knows two things: first, she will die at the end of the period,
and therefore her reservation value will be = 0; second, she is not fertile. This
means that she will not receive the extra utility of having children, nor will she
be able to provide that extra utility to any man she marries.
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We can define the offer rates that a senior woman faces in the following way.
A woman will meet a man each period with probability ηf . If she happen to meet
an old man (with probability (1− q)) he will propose with probability 1, and so
she will have a concrete offer from an old bachelor with probability
λold = ηf(1− q)
If she meets a young man (with probability q) she will only marry him if her type
x is as least as large as his reservation utility for a senior bachelorette, Rmold. For
that reason, the probability that a young man proposes to a senior woman will
be (1−Gf (Rmold)) ,what means that a senior bachelorette will receive a proposal
from a young man with probability
λyoung2 = η
fq (1−Gf (Rmold))









Utility of Marriage for Women of Age 1 (Young)
A young woman sets a reservation value taking into account that she may have
future opportunities to find a better spouse. However, if she doesn’t marry young
she will not be able to have children. Even though men of all ages are fertile, a
young woman will not be indifferent between marrying a young man or an old
man of the same match quality because a marriage with the old man lasts only
for one period. Of course, while any old man will accept her, she will only be able
to marry a young man if her match quality is higher than the reservation value
set by him, Rm (j, i) . A young man proposes to a young woman with probability
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(1−Gf (Rm (j, i))). Thus, a young woman will receive a proposal from a young
man with probability
λyoung1 = η
fq (1−Gf (Rm (j, i)))
The expected utility a woman receives from marrying when young is then
Uf1 = λ
young








Optimization Problem for Young Women
Hence, the problem facing a young woman is to choose to marry or not at Age 1
in order to maximize

















is the probability that a woman marries at age 1.








⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if y ≥ R
f (i, j) or y ≥ Rfold
0 otherwise
where Df is the decision of marrying at at age 1.
The reservation value set for an old man is equal to the discounted value that
a woman has if remains in the market at age 2 divided by k. Since men are fertile
at all ages, if a woman marry at age 1 will have children with probability one,
but if she waits until the second period she will not be able to bear children.
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Notice that, because all men are fertile, the reservation value that women set for





V f2 = (1 + β)R
f
2.1.5 Steady State Equilibrium
Reaction Functions
Solving the problems stated in Equations (2.8) and (2.10) , the reaction functions
for men and women, respectively are
Rm (j, i) =
ηmβ
h


















Rf (i, j) =




βηf (1− qGf (Rmold))
k
y
Clearly, the higher a young man’s reservation value, the greater the probability
that he will still be in the market when old. Therefore, the higher the probability
of being accepted by a women when he is older, the higher the minimum match
quality he requires when young.
For women, the intuition is as follows. The reservation value of a woman
depends positively on the average "match quality" of the available men, the
degree of patience and the meeting rate. Women will decrease their reservation
value the higher the value of having children and the higher the reservation value
that men set for older women, times the fraction of young men in the market.
The explanation for this last factor is the following: the more choosy are young
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men about old women (and the greater the fraction of young men in the market),
the larger the incentives of young women to worry about their future and marry
young.
Stock of Singles in the Market
Given the existence of an equilibrium, we can characterize the steady state num-
ber of single men and women using equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.7),(2.9) , (2.11) and
(2.12). The number of man and women that marry at the young age is
h1 = m1Φ1 (2.13)
w1 = f1Γ1 (2.14)
respectively, leaving the number of remaining (old) singles in the market as
m2 = m1 − h1 = m1 (1− Φ1) (2.15)
f2 = f1 − v1 = f1 (1− Γ1) (2.16)













the number of people who marry when old are
h2 = m2Φ2 = m1 (1− Φ1)Φ2
w2 = f2Γ2 = f1 (1− Γ1)Γ2
Theorem 1 An Equilibrium exist in the system formed by equations (2.11),
(2.12) , (2.15) and (2.16) .
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Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness in the Equilibrium Strategies) Assume that Gf (x)
and Gm (y) have the same support [0, xmax]. Assume further that there exists a
constant C < 1
xy






for all x ∈ [0, xmax]. Then there exists a unique equilibrium for the system formed
by equations (2.11) and (2.12). This equilibrium will be an interior solution, that
is, both men and women will marry either at age 1 or 2 with positive probability.
















βηf (1− qGf (Rmold)) y
k








H (x) = T1 (T2 (x)) (2.19)
In Equations (2.17) and (2.18) we show that every steady state equilibrium of
the model corresponds to a fixed point of H (.) . A long calculation, relegated to
the Appendix, shows that under the hypothesis of the theorem
| H 0 (x) |< 1
Consequently, H (x) is a contraction mapping.
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By the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed point of
H (.) .Call itRmold.A short argument in the Appendix shows thatR
m
old ∈ [0, xmax),
and the associated Rfold ∈ [0, xmax), and that the uniqueness is ensured for Rm
and Rf .We conclude that the unique fixed point of H (.) corresponds to a steady
state equilibrium of the model.
Remark 1 The hypothesis of Theorem 1 is trivially satisfied if Gf (x) and Gm (y)
are uniformly distributed with support [0, 1]
Proposition 3 Assume that the distributions of men and women are equal. Pro-
vided that people derive utility for having children within marriage (k > 1), then
men will be choosier than women, that is, Rm > Rf .
Proof. See Appendix
2.1.6 Example: Uniform Distribution
In order to gain further intuition on the model, in this section we will solve the
model assuming that the distribution of men and women of ages 1 or 2 is uniform
with support [0, 1] . That is:
Gf(x) = Gm(y) ∼ U [0, 1]
With this specification, the unique equilibrium is:
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¢ηfβ [2− qηmβ (1 + p (k − 1))]
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Equations (2.15) and (2.16) can be solved numerically in order to find the
steady state equilibrium of the model. Figure 2.1 show the equilibrium values of
selected variables as a function of k ∈ [1, 2], considering the following values for
the parameters:
θ = 0.5 β = 0.9 µ = 0.9 m1 = f1 = 100
Figure 2.1 shows how the reservation values of men and women, the fraction
of single men (women) who are young, the probability of marriage at Age 1 and
the ratio Single Men/Single Women change with the value of children (k) . As
shown, the higher the increase in the utility of marriage for having children, the
lower the reservation values for women, and the higher the probability that a
woman marry young. Because women marry younger, the fraction of young
women over the total of single women is increasing with k. On the other hand,
men’s behavior is the opposite to the one of women but the patterns seem to be
relatively more stable. Therefore, the predictions of this simple 2-period model
are the following:
• The higher the value of having children within marriage, women tend to
marry younger and men older. For that reason, the age difference in mar-
riage tend to increase with higher values of k.
• Single women in the marriage market tend to be younger than single men.
That is, a given man is more likely to meet a young woman than is a woman
to meet a young man.
• As their reservation values decrease with higher values of k, match qualities
for women also tend to decrease.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium of the 2 Period Model for Different Values of k.
2.2 A Generalized Model
In this section we extend the simple two period model to a more general finite
horizon model. This general model is solved numerically. The following are the
modified assumptions:
Both men and women live T periods. Women are fertile for L periods, men are
fertile forN periods, with L ≤ N ≤ T.While women’s fecundity decrease linearly
form period L1 to L, men keep their full fecundity until they lose it completely
at period N.
As in the two period model above, women will meet at most one man per
period and vice versa. The probability of meeting is determined by equations
(2.2) and (2.3) .
As before, an exogenous flow of single young people of age 1, f1 women and
m1 men enter the market each period and the men and women who do not marry
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will remain in the market. Hence, the total number of single women and men will
be the sum of the stock of single men and single women ages i and j respectively,


















which are endogenously determined.
We redefine the extra utility for having children for a man who marries at age
j with a woman of age i as kmji where
kmji =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k if j ≤ N and i ≤ L1
k − (k−1)(i−L1)
(L+1−L1) if L1 < i ≤ L and j ≤ N
1 otherwise
(2.24)
Similarly, for a woman of age i who marries a man of age j,
kfi,j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
k if i ≤ L1 and j ≤ N
k − (k−1)(i−L1)
(L+1−L1) if L1 < i ≤ L and j ≤ N
1 otherwise
(2.25)
where k > 1 and is subject to the condition established in (2.5) .
Given that the number of periods will be large enough in order to calibrate
the results of the model with census data by age, it will be convenient to relax the
assumption that people die only in the last period. For that reason we introduce a
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probability of dying each period that depends on the agent’s age. The probability
of dying in a given period for women and men of ages i, j will be
dmj for a man of age j < T




In the same way, the probability of that the marriage ends in a given period
















The characteristics of the utility functions for men and women remain as in
the model of the previous section.
2.2.1 The Man’s Optimization Problem
Each period a man of age j will meet a woman of age i with probability ηmp (i)
(by equations (2.3) and (2.22)). The probability of being accepted by that woman
depends on the age of both the man and the woman. A man of age j will receive
an offer from a woman of age i with probability




where Rf (i, j) will be the reservation value that a woman of age i set for a man
of age j.
Then the probability that a man of age j has a concrete concrete opportunity
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Expected Utility of Marrying at age j
The expected utility that a man of age j derives from marrying a woman of
age i depends on both the man’s age and the woman’s age. This occurs not
only because fecundity matters, but also because the age of each partner will
determine how long they will enjoy each other company. Consider first a man
of age j where j ≤ L1 (a fertile man such that a woman of the same age is still
completely fertile). In this case he will be indifferent between any woman his
age or younger because he will spend with her the rest of his life. If he marries
an older woman, he will survive her and receive zero utility from the moment he
become a widower until his own death. The case of an infertile (j > N) man is
similar, because the only utility of marriage is derived from the quality of the
match and the length of the marriage. In the case that L1 < j ≤ N (a fertile
man who is older than the age at which women start losing fecundity), a man
will not be indifferent between any woman younger than himself because he will
receive extra utility from a fully fertile spouse. Therefore, the expected utility of
a man of age j who marries a woman of age i will be the discounted sum of the
flows of expected payoffs of marriage through the length of the marriage. That
is,







Given that the probability of a marriage offer from women of different ages
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Probabilities of Marriage for Men




α (j, i) (1−Gf (Rm (j, i))) (2.29)
Objective Function for Men
Given Equations (2.28) and (2.29) , the objective function for any man at a given









(1− Φ (s− 1))
The Bellman Equation for the problem above is







(1− Φ (j))βV m (j + 1)
¤
(2.30)
V m (T ) = Um (T )
Dmj =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if x > R
m (j, i)
0 otherwise
where Dmj is the decision of marrying at age j with a woman of age i.
Men’s Reservation Values
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⎞⎠ = βV mj+1 if 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1
The reservation value that a man of age j sets for a given woman of age i is







if 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1
0 if j = T
(2.31)
Stocks of Single and Married Males
The stocks of singles of age j will be equal to the surviving singles of age j − 1
who did not married during the last period. That is




(1− Φ (j − 1)) (2.32)
Similarly to the 2-period Model (see Equation (2.13)), the total men who
marry at age j will be
h (j) = m (j)Φ (j)
and the stock of married men of age j will be the sum of the surviving males who







(1− dms ) (2.33)
2.2.2 The Woman’s Optimization Problem
Each period a woman of age i will meet a man of age j with probability ηfq (j)
(by Equations(2.2) and (2.23)). As above, the probability of being accepted by
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that bachelor will depend on the age of both of the woman and the man she meet.
The probability that the woman of age i receives an offer from a man of age j is
λ (i, j) = ηfq (j) (1−Gf(Rm (j, i)))
where Rm (j, i) will be the reservation value that a man of age j set for a woman
of age i.




λ (i, j) =
TX
j=1
ηfq (j) (1−Gf(Rm (j, i))) . (2.34)
Expected Utility of Marrying at age i
In the same way as for men, the expected utility that a woman of age i derives
from marrying a man of age j depends on the expected length of the marriage






















Probabilities of Marriage for Women












Objective Function for Women
Given Equations (2.36) and (2.37) , the objective function of a single woman at










As is the case of the man above, the Bellman Equation for the woman’s problem
is then







(1− Γ (i))βV f (i+ 1)
i
(2.38)
V f (T ) = Uf (T )
Dfi =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if y > R
f (i, j)
0 otherwise
where Dfi is the decision of marrying at age i with a man of age j.
Reservation Values for Women






⎞⎠ = βV f (i+ 1) if 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1
The reservation value for a woman of age i with respect to a man of age j will be







βV f (i+ 1) if 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1
0 if i = T
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Stocks of Single and Married Females
Similarly to the previous case, we define the number of single women of age i as
follows




(1− Γ (i− 1)) . (2.39)
The total of women who marry at age i will be
w (i) = f (i)Γ (i)












Now we can solve numerically the system formed by Equations (2.30), (2.32),
(2.38) and (2.39). The distribution functions Gf (x) and Gm (y) are both uniform
with support [0, 1] and the values given to the parameters will be the following7:
T = 60 (75 years old) N = 45 (60 years old)
L1 = 20 (35 years old) L = 30 (46 years old)
µ = 0.9 k = 1.3
β = 0.915 θ = 0.5
m1 = 100 f1 = 100
Reservation Values and Marriage Offers





















Figure 2.2: Reservation Values for People of the Same Age
Figure 2.2 shows the reservation values for men and women with respect to peo-
ple of the opposite sex of the same age and Figure 2.3 shows the probability of
receiving a marriage offer at each age (by Equations (2.26) and (2.34)). Interpret-
ing both graphics will help to summarize several of the predictions of the model
about marriage behavior.
As shown in Figure 2.2, women younger than age 34 set a higher reservation
value than men of the same age. The reason for this is the traditional one: fertile
women are outnumbered by fertile men. As in Siow (1998), a young woman faces
relatively better market conditions than a man of her age. This is what has been
emphasized by the literature. In principle there is a counter balancing force
lowering the reservation values of women that is their relatively shorter fecundity
horizon. However, for women in their late teens or early twenties the distant end
of their fecundity years is sufficiently removed that the better marriage market























Figure 2.3: Probability of Receiving a Marriage Offer for Men (αj) and Women
(λi)
When the decline in fecundity is nearer, the reservation values of women start
to decrease sharply. In this example we assume that fecundity start to decline
at age 36, and this causes the reservation value to start to decrease in the mid
twenties and continue through the end of their fertile years. Note that after
fecundity ends, reservation values continue to decline. This however is driven by
mortality as the shorter life expectancy is cause fewer chances to marry
The behavior of men is different than the one of women. The reservation value
for men younger than age 34 is flat and lower than the one for women because,
as stated above, fertile men outnumber fertile women. When women’s fecundity
start to decline around 35 years old, men of the same age raise their reservation
value for those women in light of their increasing probability of being barren.
Around age 50, the reservation values for men decrease sharply in light of the
foreseeable loss of fecundity (in this example at age 60).
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The behavior of men and women in this general model can be compared to
the results established in the 2-period model. One of the principal results of the
model was that women (in period 1) set a reservation value lower than the one
set by men. This is because the 2-period model does not give women sufficient
distance from the end of fecundity to take advantage of their relative scarcity at
a point in time.
Figure 2.3 reflects how reservation values of men and women affect the op-
portunities of the other side of the market. In the case of women, the probability
of receiving a marriage offer drops when they are in their middle 30’s (when
fecundity starts to decline). Note that offers start to decline later than when
reservation values begin to decline (at age 25). The reason for this is that the
decline in offers from men to women is a function of men’s reservation values.
Women who are younger than 35 remain completely acceptable to men as they
are still completely fertile. This occurs for two important but different reasons.
First, women worry about their own ability to bare children and the utility they
will receive for this. Second, women rationally anticipate their worsening position
in the marriage market knowing that men will begin increasing their reservation
value for women over 35 as younger women will remain as a viable substitute.
For men, the probability of receiving a marriage offer decreases at an increasing
rate between ages 35 and 60.
Hazard Rates
Figure 2.4 shows the hazard rates of marriage for men and women at each age.
Observe that there is a sharp increase in the probability that single women marry
from their late 20’s to their middle 30’s. That increase is due to lower women’s
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reservation values as the decline in fecundity is approaching. Assuming that
fecundity starts to decline at age 35, the figure shows how the hazard rate for
women increase at a diminishing rate from 35 to 40 and then decrease trough
the end of her life. As women’s fecundity declines, men are more reluctant to
marry them due to the increasing risk of not having a child (observe in Figure
2.2 how men from 35 to 46 increase their reservation value for women of the same
age). When women lose fecundity completely (here at age 47), notice the kink
in the hazard rate curve. The explanation for this is that a new market appears:
infertile women are now much less choosy about marrying infertile men.
The pattern of the hazard rates for men is similar to that of women, but the
timing is different. As the reservation values of men decrease with time, their
hazard rates for marriage are increasing through their fertile period (until 60 years
old).Thereafter the reservation values decrease sharply. Then, as infertile women
become acceptable, the drop stops to then continue as a slower pace during the
last few years of their life.
Stocks of Men and Women by Marital Status
Figure 2.5 shows the stocks of single men, single women, married men (by Equa-
tion (2.33)) andmarried women (Equation (2.40)) at each age. The actual pattern
of the 2000 US census data (whites) is displayed in Figure 2.6. Note that single
men outnumber single women from their early 20’s until near age 60, and that
the number of married women is greater than the number of married men in
most of the life cycle. The reason for this is that, since more women marry at a
young age, this affects the stocks of people of all ages. One interesting feature


































approaches one, but before reaching parity the number of married men starts to
decline more quickly than the number of married women. because men marry
later than women, for to attain parity with women there must be ages at which
men marry with higher probability than women. This does occur (after age 42)
but the higher mortality rates of men offset the higher marriage rates leaving the
stock of married women to be greater than the stock of married men. Stocks
of Single Men (m (j)) , Single Women (f (i)) , Married Men (Hj) and Married
Women (Wi)
Comparative Statics
This model has two key parameters -the value of having children within marriage,
k and the discount factor, β.Here we analyze how do the model predictions change
with changes in these parameters. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 the comparative statics


















































Figure 2.6: Stock of single and ever married men and women in US Census 2000
(Whites - 5% Sample)
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k = 1.1, a low premium for having children within marriage; in this case we have
that men marry at age 28 and women at 27.5. The pattern of the sex ratio is
almost flat, with a small increase during the period of declining fecundity and
then a more pronounced decline from mid 50’s (due to higher male mortality
rates). That is, if having children does not play a big role in the decision of
marriage, the age difference tend to disappear, and the sex ratio of singles differs
from parity only because differential mortality of men and women. As the value
of having a family increases, men marry at older ages and women at younger
ages. This causes the sex ratio to have an inverted U-shape that peaks during
the decline in women’s fecundity. One interesting case is what happen when
k = 1. As shown in Figure 2.7, men marry on average younger than women. The
sex ratio of singles is then decreasing during the entire life cycle (Figure 2.8).
If k = 1, it is only mortality that causes the sex ratio to differ from parity and
cause any age difference at marriage between men and women. The higher male
mortality causes a scarcity of men increasing the probability of an offer per period
and improving their marriage prospects. Given that this solution is calculated
with the mortality rates for whites in the U.S. in 1995, an even greater imbalance
in young mortality between men and women (for example Blacks in the U.S.)
could have a big effect on the composition of the marriage market and age at
marriage for men and women.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the age at marriage and the pattern of the sex
ratio for singles at different values of β. As one can imagine, people tend to
marry later when they are more patient (higher levels of β). Also, as shown in
Figure 2.10, the sex ratio tends to be flatter for levels of β within the usual range















k=1 k=1.1 k=1.3 k= 1.5 k= 1.8 k=2
Men
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β= 0.85 β= 0.89 β= 0.91 β= 0.95 β= 0.99
Men
Women
Figure 2.9: Average Age at Marriage for Different Values of β (k = 1.3)
(say β = 0.85). Here again men marry younger than women and the sex ratio
is decreasing at all ages. When people discount future utility heavily enough,
the differential mortality rates between men and women, even when very small,
cause men to marry younger than women (same effect as when children within
marriage are not valuable).
2.3 Comparison with Census Data
2.3.1 US Census 2000
In order to compare the model results with US Census data two sources of data
are used. The data on age at first marriage is from the 1989-95 Marriage Detail
File (MDF) of the U.S. Vital Statistics Registry.8 For all other statistics the
8The Marriage Detail File has not been released since 1995 and is the closest data to the





























Figure 2.10: Ratio Single Men/Single Women by Age for Different Levels of β
(k = 1.3)
data is from the 2000 IPUMS 5% data. People in institutions are excluded
from the sample, and the analysis is limited to people born in the US. Despite
pooling across cohorts, the fact that most marriages occur by age 40 minimizes
that problem. Of particular interest is the different marriage markets for White
and Black Americans. Therefore a separate analysis is conducted for Blacks and
Whites.
Whites
Figure 2.11 and Table 2.1 show a comparison between the model results and the
data when β = 0.92 and k = 1.2. The model predicts men and women marrying
later (men at age 27.4 and women at 26.6 years old compared with the actual




















single sex ratio (model)
single sex ratio (US 2000)
ever married sex ratio (model)
ever married sex ratio (US 2000)
Figure 2.11: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. US Census 2000 (Whites)
and Model (k = 1.2, β = 0.92) with mortality rates for whites.
first marriage (0.8 year versus 1.6 years in the data). Table 2.1 also displays a
comparison between the model and the census data and MDF for the average age
of singles and ever married, the ratio single men/single women, the fraction of
ever married and widows/ers (only widows in the model) and the sex ratio of ever
married. Figure 2.11 shows the pattern of the sex ratio by age for singles and
ever married. Observe that the ratio single male/single female peaks at around
age 40 in the data and around the assumed end of fecundity (age 47) in the model
results.
Blacks
Figure 2.12 and Table 2.2 show a comparison between the model results and the
census data when β = 0.92 and k = 1.2. In this case while the model predicts
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Model Predictions and US Census 2000: Whites
Model US 2000
(1) (2)
Men Women Men Women
ß 0.92
k 1.20
Age of First Marriage 27.4 26.6 26.1 24.1
Average Age of Singles 27.2 26.9 28.1 27.2
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.07 1.25
Ever Married (%) 0.721 0.765 0.740 0.790
Fraction of Singles 45 and Over 0.059 0.049 0.065 0.048
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.057 0.015 0.063
Average Age of Ever Married 48.1 48.6 47.9 47.6
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.94 0.90
Total Sex Ratio 0.98 0.97



























Figure 2.12: Ratio Single Males/Single Females. US Census 2000 (Blacks) and
Model (k = 1.2, β = 0.92) with mortality rates for blacks.
women marrying older than men and the age at first marriage for black men falls
short with respect to the data (26.3 versus 27.9)
How important is differential mortality? What is particularly important in
the model is the relative mortality of men and women in a racial group. Figure
2.13 shows the relative mortality rate for men versus women at each age. Notice
that while the mortality rate of men is greater than the mortality rate of women
for both Blacks and whites, the mortality rate for Black men relative to Black
women is extremely large between ages 15 and 28. 9
9It is well known that the fraction of men in federal or state prison or local jails at these
ages is also differentially high for Black men. Statistics from the Bureau if Justice Statistics
suggest that approximately 9-12% of Black men between ages 18 and 29 are in federal or state
prison or in a local jail. This would tend to reinforce the results discussed here.
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Model Predictions and US Census 2000: Blacks
Model US 2000
(1) (2)
Men Women Men Women
ß 0.920
k 1.20
Age of First Marriage 26.26 26.37 27.9 26.7
Average Age of Singles 25.7 28.0 28.9 29.7
Sex Ratio of Singles 0.880 0.828
Ever Married (%) 0.726 0.718 0.562 0.579
Fraction of Singles Over 45 0.043 0.076 0.087 0.140
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.086 0.024 0.081
Average Age of Ever Married 46.3 47.8 46.8 47.2
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.914 0.771
Total Sex Ratio 0.90 0.79
Table 2.2: Comparison Between Model and US Census 2000 (Blacks)
50
How does the higher mortality of Black men effect the marriage market equi-
librium? To analyze this, Figure 2.14 shows the reservation values for Black men
and women as well as white men and women at each age. Here the same para-
meter values apply to both races but each race is calculated according to their
own race (and gender) specific mortality rates. In Figure 2.14 it is clear that un-
like whites, where the reservation value for men is higher than for women only at
older ages, for Blacks, the reservation value for men is higher than the reservation
for women at all ages. That is, if children within marriage are not very valuable
(relative to outside of marriage), then the relative scarcity of fertile women plays
only a weak role in the market. Conversely, the higher mortality rates for Black
men give them the bargaining power in the market. For that reason, Black men
receive relatively more offers than women reducing their waiting time to marriage
from what it would be with lower mortality. The net result is that Black men
and women tend to marry around the same age.
Figure 2.15 shows that unlike for white Americans, the ratio of single men to
single women falls below parity at all ages for Black men. Higher male mortality
would seem to almost mechanically cause the sex ratio of single men to single
women to fall below parity (because there are generally fewer men alive than
women). However, white men also have higher mortality than white women.
The mortality of white men is not sufficiently high relative to white women to
offset the natural scarcity that young women enjoy because of women’s fecundity
is limited and children within marriage are valuable (k > 1). For whites, the
scarcity of fertile women (driven by limited fecundity) dominates the scarcity of
men (driven by differential mortality). Thus white women are choosier at young
ages causing young men to wait to marry until the terms of trade change in
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their favor (as women’s fecundity declines). Thus for whites, even though male
mortality is greater than female mortality, the sex ratio of single men to single
women remains above parity for much of the life cycle.
Blacks are different. Black women face the same scarcity producing effect
of a limited fecundity horizon as white women. However, Black male mortality
is sufficiently greater than Black female mortality to offset the natural scarcity
women usually enjoy at young ages. With differentially high Black male mortality,
it is men that are scarce over the entire life cycle. Thus Black men do not face
the same incentives to delay marriage as they do not have growing scarcity over
time (as do white men). For this reason, Black men and women marry at close
to the same age and the fewer Black men that survive mortality end up driving
the sex ratio below parity at all ages. Two factors play a role in making the sex
ratios for Blacks decrease over the entire life cycle: First the higher mortality
rates for Black men and second, the fact that Black men do not wait more than
women in order to marry.
The consequence of this behavior is that a larger fraction of Black women
never marry. As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, in 2000, 13% of Black women
aged 45 and over never married compared to only 5 % of White women. The
predictions of the model is qualitatively similar. However the fraction of women
predicted never to marry are lower for both races (9% for Blacks versus 5% for
Whites).10
This finding is related to the Wilson Hypothesis, although the mechanism
leading to lower marriage rates is different. Wilson’s model is typically interpreted
as Black women rejecting Black men (who have made offers) because they do not


























































Figure 2.14: Reservation Values for Potential Spouses of the Same Age. Model




























Figure 2.15: Ratio Single Men/Single Women. Model with k = 1.2, β = .92 and
Mortality for Blacks and Whites in 1992.
bring enough to the marriage (i.e. are not "marriageable" because of poor job
prospects). In my model Black women also delay marriage (or do not marry)
but it is because men reject women. Men reject women because the higher male
mortality makes them scarce and the low value of children within marriage make
women not as valuable to men.
2.3.2 France
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.16 compare the model results with the 1999 France census.
Data is from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies - France
for the entire population who lives in metropolitan areas. The model results are
for β = 0.925 and k = 1.25. Notice than in this case the predictions of the model




Men Women Men Women
β 0.925
k 1.25
Age of First Marriage 29.4 27.9 30.2 28.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.13 1.16
Ever Married (%) 0.69 0.74 0.61 0.67
Fraction of Widows 0.07 0.02 0.10
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.90 0.87
Total Sex Ratio 0.96 0.97
Table 2.3: Comparison Between Model and France Census 1999
2.3.3 Sweden
Here we compare the model results with data for the year 2000 in Sweden. Data
is form Statistics Sweden for the entire population. The model results are for
β = 0.95 and k = 1.25. Here the model predicts accurately the age at first
marriage for men (32.3 years) and women marry in average one year earlier in
the data than when the model results predict (30.1 versus 31.3 years). Thus, the





























Figure 2.16: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. Census 1999 (France) and





















Figure 2.17: Sex Ratio for Single and Ever Married. Census 2000 (Sweden) and




Men Women Men Women
β 0.95
k 1.25
Age of First Marriage 32.3 31.3 32.4 30.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.12 1.24
Ever Married (%) 0.64 0.68 0.55 0.64
Fraction of Widows/ers 0.05 0.03 0.08
Sex Ratio for Ever Married 0.95 0.87
Total Sex Ratio 1.00 1.01
Table 2.4: Comparison Between Model and Census 2000 (Sweden)
2.3.4 US in Previous Decades
Figure 3.3 shows the median age at first marriage in US since 1940. The tendency
to delaying marriage over the last decades is clear. This reflects an increase in
both mean and variance of the age at marriage for men and women. For example
the mean age at first marriage for white males married between 1960 and 1965
was 23.5 years, and 21 years for white females. In 1975-80 the mean for white
males was 23.9 and 21.8 for white females. Note that the age difference between
men and women appear to be quite stable.11
Figure 2.19 shows the sex ratio (single males/single females) for whites in
11For an empirical study about the change in marriage patterns in the US in last decades,
see Rose (2001).
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the US for 1960, 1980 and 2000. The age pattern of sex ratios appear to have
changed over time. First, the pattern of the sex ratio by age is flatter in 1980 with
respect to 1960 and even more flat in 2000. Second, the "peak" sex ratio in 1960
and 1980 was in the mid 20’s. This peak moved to the mid 30’s in 2000 census.
Figure 2.20 shows the pattern of the sex ratio (single males/single females) for
blacks in the US for 1960, 1980 and 2000. As in the case of whites, the pattern
appear to have changed over time. While in 1960 the graphic shows a very similar
pattern to the one for whites, that is not the case for 1980 and 2000.
In the case of 1960, in order to achieve a similar pattern to that of the data it
would be necessary to assume that women’s fecundity starts to decrease at age
24. This is a signal that this 2 parameter model is not enough in order to explain
the behavior of the marriage market 40 years ago.
The last few decades observed more similar roles for men and women. For
example, in the US, the level of education have become increasingly similar and
women’s labor participation have increased dramatically in the last 20 years.
Moreover, marriage specialization have consequently decreased12, and traditional
roles in marriage are not so common as they were in the past. Even though
social norms have changed making that roles of men and women became more
and more similar, the fecundity horizon differences will persist and that can be
an explanation of why women still tend to marry older men.
2.3.5 Developing Countries
Figure 2.21 shows the sex ratio by age for Kenya and Vietnam in 1999 and Mexico
in 2000. It easy to tell that the data for developed countries match better with the
12For a study on the decline in marriage specialization, see Lundberg and Rose (1998)
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Figure 2.20: Sex Ratio (Single Men/Single Women) in the US (Blacks)
model that the one for developing countries. Notice than, for these countries the
pattern is very different than the in the case of the US or the European countries
described above. In the three countries of the figure the sex ratio reaches a
maximum at ages 24-27 and then decreases sharply. This is somewhat similar to
the pattern in the US in 1960 (Figure 2.19 above).
In summary, this model does a better job explaining the patterns in developed
countries than in developing countries, and in recent times compared to previous
decades. In this model the evolution of the sex ratio with age is entirely deter-
mined by the different fecundity horizon of men and women. For that reason, all
other differences between sexes intentionally excluded in this model, obviously
also play a role in marriage behavior. Social norms may also be important. For
example, when we find a peak in the sex ratio around 25 years old, as in Figure
2.21, or the sharply increase in the sex ratio in the early twenties in US in 1960,






























Figure 2.21: Ratio Single Men/Single Women. Kenya and Vietnam, 1999 and
Mexico 2000
marry. What is important is that his social norm appear to be more significant
in societies where traditional marital roles are still well defined.
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Chapter 3
A Model of Assortative Mating
In this chapter we extend the model of the previous chapter to a two market
framework in order to analyze the effect of limited fecundity, mortality and size
of the market on assortative mating. As before, after a description of the model,
a numerical solution of the model and a discussion of its implications, the model
implications will be compared with US data. The following are the modified
assumptions:
There are two groups of men and women, for example black and white men
and women. The total single population will be the sum of single people in the
two groups:
M =M1 +M2
F = F1 + F2
So, for example M is the number of single men as before while M1 might be the
number of single white men and M2 the number of single black men.
As before, an exogenous flow of single people of each group and age 1, f1 (1) ,
f2 (1) , m1 (1) and m2 (1) enter the market each period and the men and women
who do not marry will remain in the market.
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Therefore, the fraction of single men and women from Group i and of ages







The assumptions of the previous chapter about value of children and declining
fertility remain untouched here. However, we make an additional assumption
about intergroup marriage. Even though people can marry across groups, we
assume, as in Wong (2003) that people receive a discount in utility for marry-
ing someone of a different group. This discount will be proportional at a rate
τ ∈ [0, 1)1,2. Therefore the payoff per period that a woman or a man (ages s, t
respectively) will receive for marrying a person of the same or different group will
be the following:
1Wong (2003) assumes that the discount in utility is a lump sum.
2This is a model of "own group preference". However, the model is general enough to allow
for example that both groups of women prefer the same group of men or vice-versa, or that
the preferences differ between groups or between men and women. Suppose for example that
Group 1 and 2 are index of potential income. Therefore all women regardless of their earnings
will prefer men of Group 1.
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Spouse of the same group Spouse of different group
Women kfs,ty (1− τ) kfs,ty
Men kmt,sx (1− τ) kmt,sx
where kmt,s and k
f
s,t follow the patterns described in (2.24) and (2.25) .
As before, we assume random matching and at most one meeting per pe-
riod. However here the matching functions will be slightly different from those
described in equations (2.1) , (2.3) and (2.2) . Now the probability of meeting
someone of the opposite sex and of the certain group will depend on the rela-
tive size of the group and of the relative scarcity of each sex within the group.
























where Ψ1 = M1+F1M+F and Ψ2 =
M2+F2
M+F
are the relative weight of each group in
the total population of singles. The fecundity horizon is assumed equal for both
groups, but the mortality rates can differ. Therefore,
δmi,t for a man of age t < T




















is the probability that a marriage between a husband of Group i and age t and a
wife from Group j and age s ends in the current period because of the death of
one of the spouses, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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3.1 The Man’s Problem
Each period a man from Group i and of age t will meet at most a woman from





pi (s) . Therefore, the
probability that a man from Group i and of age t receives a proposal from a
woman from the same group and age s is










and the probability of an offer from a woman from a different Group j 6= i and
age s is










where Rfii (s, t) and R
f
ji (s, t) are the reservation values that a woman of age s
from Group i, j ∈ {1, 2} set for a man of age t from Group i, respectively
3.1.1 Expected Utility of Marrying at age t
The expected utility that a man from Group i of age t derives from marrying a
woman of age s will be similar to that established in equation (2.27) with respect
to age, but with a discount in utility when marrying someone of Group j 6= i.
























Given that the probability of a marriage offer from women of different ages











ij (t, s) (3.7)
3.1.2 Probabilities of Marriage for Men
A single man of Group i and age t will marry a woman from the same group of
age s with probability
φii(t, s) = αii (t, s) (1−Gf (Rmii (t, s))) (3.8)
and a woman of the other group with probability



























3.1.3 Objective Function for Men
Given Equations (3.7) and (3.10) , the objective function for any man at a given









(1− φi (s− 1)) (3.11)
The Bellman Equation for the problem above is







(1− φi)βV mi (t+ 1)
¤
(3.12)





⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if x > R
m




where Dmi,t is the decision of marrying at age t for a man from Group i.
3.1.4 Men’s Reservation Values








⎞⎠ = βV mi (t+ 1) (3.13)
if 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
and










⎞⎠ = βV mi (t+ 1)(3.14)
if 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
The reservation value that a man of age t from Group i sets for a given woman
from the same group of age s is










βV mi (t+ 1) if 1 ≤ t < T
0 if t = T
(3.15)
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and for a woman of Group j 6= i












βV mi (t+ 1) if 1 ≤ t < T
0 if t = T
(3.16)
3.2 The Woman’s Problem
The probability that a woman of age s from Group i receives an marriage offer






qi (t) (1−Gf(Rmii (t, s))) (3.17)






qj (t) (1−Gf(Rm21 (t, s))) (3.18)
3.2.1 Expected Utility of Marrying at age s
In the same way as for men, the expected utility that a woman of age s and Group
i derives from marrying a man of age t depends on the group of the spouse and











for a husband of the same group i and














for a husband from Group j 6= i.
As in the case of men, the expected utility for a woman from Group i of











ij (s, t) (3.21)
3.2.2 Probabilities of Marriage for Women
A single woman of Group i and age s will marry a man from the same group and
age s with probability







and a man from Group j 6= i with probability


































3.2.3 Objective Function for Women
Given Equations (3.21) and (3.24) , the objective function of a single woman at









(1− Γi (s− 1)) (3.25)
As is the case of the man above, the Bellman Equation for the woman’s problem
is then







(1− Γi (s))βV fi (s+ 1)
i
(3.26)





⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if y > R
f




where Dfi,s is the decision of a woman of Group i to marry at age s a man of age
t.
3.2.4 Reservation Values for Women









⎞⎠ = βV fi (s+ 1) (3.27)
if 1 ≤ s < T
The reservation value for a woman of age s with respect to a man of age t from
Group i will be










βV fi (s+ 1) if 1 ≤ s < T
0 if s = T
(3.28)
and with respect a man of Group j 6= i












βV fi (s+ 1) if 1 ≤ s < T
0 if s = T
(3.29)
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3.3 Stocks of Single and Married People
3.3.1 Men
The stocks of singles of age t and Group i (i ∈ {1, 2})will be equal to the surviving
singles of age t− 1 who did not marry during the last period. That is




(1− Φs(t− 1)) (3.30)
Similarly, the total number of men who marry at age t will be
hi (t) = mi(t)Φi(t) (3.31)
and the stock of married men of age t will be the sum of the surviving males who











We will also define the fraction of men of age t and Group i who marry a
woman of the other group. Therefore, the fraction of men of Group i and age t







Similarly to the previous case, we define the number of single women of age s





(1− Γi(s− 1)) . (3.34)
The total of women who marry at age t will be
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wi (s) = fi(s)Γi(s) (3.35)











Similarly as before, the fraction of women of Group i and age s who marry







Now we can solve numerically the system formed by Equations (3.12), (3.30),
(3.26) and (3.34). The distribution functions Gf (x) and Gm (y) are uniform with
support [0, 1] (as in the previous chapter) and the values given to the parameters
will be the following:
T = 60 (75 years old) N = 45 (60 years old)
L1 = 20 (35 years old) L = 30 (46 years old)
µ = 0.9 k = 1.2
β = 0.92 θ = 0.5
m1 (1) = m2 (1) = 100 f1 (1) = f2 (1) = 100
For now we assume that the mortality rates for men and women are the same for
the two groups (U.S. 1992 for whites).
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3.4.1 Different Levels of Within Group Preference (τ)
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the evolution of the reservation values that people of
Group i ∈ {1, 2} have for people of the same and different groups when people
prefer to marry within a group. Since in this example the two groups have the
same size the reservation values will be the same. The solid line represent the
case when people are indifferent about marrying within or across groups (τ = 0) ,
which is equivalent to the baseline case of the previous chapter. The preference
for within group marriage (τ > 0) acts as a friction in the market. Therefore
men and women lower the reservation values for people of the same group (they
will only meet them 50% of the time) and raise them for people of the other
group. However, after comparing figures 3.1 and 3.2 one may notice that for
women, reservation values tend to converge more rapidly after the age of 30 than
for men. This has direct consequences on the dynamics of intergroup marriage
of men and women as will be shown below.
The effect of the added search friction introduced by adding a preference for
marrying within a group is shown by Table 3.1. As the rate of group preference
(τ) increases, the fraction of intergroup marriage and the fraction of people ever
married decreases. In addition, people tend to marry later in general if they end
up marrying someone outside their group. For example, if τ = 0.2, the average
age of marriage for a woman is 26.7 years but if she marries outside their group
the average age increases to 27.7 years.
One interesting result of the model is that the willingness to marry someone
outside ones own group increase with age. Figure 3.3 shows the fraction of women
and men marrying someone outside their own group by age for different levels of




















































Figure 3.2: Reservation values of men for different levels of for same group pref-
erence
74
τ = 0 τ = 0.2 τ = 0.4
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Size 0.50 0.50 0.50
Age at Marriage (same) 27.3 26.3 27.5 26.7 28.1 27.3
Age at Marriage (other) 27.3 26.3 28.8 27.7 61.4 56.9
Ever Married 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.72
Intergroup Marriage 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.01
Sex Ratio 1.02 1.01 1.01



























Men     
τ = 0.2
Figure 3.3: Fraction of men and women who marry people outside their own
group
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are indifferent respect who to marry (τ = 0) . Not surprisingly, in this case half
of all marriages are between people of different group, regardless of age. That is
not the case when τ > 0. For example, for τ = 0.2, Figure 3.3 shows that the
fraction of women who marry someone outside their group increases relative to
the fraction of men marrying outside their group during the late 20’s and early
30’s (right before the decline in fecundity starts); then the fraction for women
declines during their 40’s. From the mid 40’s intermarry increases for both men
and women monotonically.
3.4.2 Different Size of Each Group
Now we allow the two groups to have different relative sizes, for a given rate
of same group preference (τ = 0.2). The way to introduce different sizes in the
model will be through the initial flow of men and women to the market. Keeping
the number of people in Group 1 constant, in the following examples the values
of f2 (1) and m2 (1) will be set in a way to make Group 2 be first 10% and then
35% of the market. This is another way to introduce friction in the market,
because the minority group will now face increasing search frictions in order to
meet people of the same group. On the other hand, the majority group will face
less friction compared with the case where both groups are the same size.
Table 3.2 shows the means of the principal variables of the model in three
cases: the top panel shows the results when both groups are of the same size,
the middle panel when the size of Group 2 is 35 % of the market, and the bottom
the case when the minority group is only 10% of the population. Also, Figure 3.4
shows the evolution of the intergroup marriage over ages when Group 1 is 65%





Age at Marriage 27.7 26.9
Age at Marriage (same group) 27.5 26.7
Age at Marriage (other group) 28.8 27.7
Ever Married 0.72 0.74
Intergroup Marriage 0.20 0.20
Sex Ratio 1.01
Different Size
Group 1 Group 2
Men Women Men Women
Size 0.65 0.35
Age at Marriage 27.5 26.7 28.1 27.2
Age at Marriage (same group) 27.2 26.3 27.9 27.3
Age at Marriage (other group) 29.4 29.1 28.6 26.9
Ever Married 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.73
Intergroup Marriage 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.28
Sex Ratio 1.014 1.014
Size 0.90 0.10
Age at Marriage 27.3 26.5 28.8 27.6
Age at Marriage (same group) 27.0 26.1 29.0 29.2
Age at Marriage (other group) 31.9 33.9 28.7 26.5
Ever Married 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.70
Intergroup Marriage 0.06 0.06 0.58 0.57
Sex Ratio 1.02 1.00
Table 3.2: Groups of Different Size. Solution of the model when t=0.2
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The principal characteristics of the results are the following:
1. The fraction of the people who marry someone of the other group increases
by age. For women, this fraction increase more rapidly before fecundity





























Figure 3.4: Fraction of intergroup marriage by age for groups of different size.
2. Minority groups tend to marry later than the majority group. As shown in
Table 3.2, if 35% of the population belong to a certain group, the average
age of marriage is higher than the group comprising 65% of the population,
for both men (28.1 versus 27.5 years) and women (27.2 versus 26.7 years).
3. When groups are of the same size, the average age at first marriage is higher
for both men and women if their spouse is in the other group. If the size
of the groups is different, the same is true for people of the majority group.
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Women of minority groups, however, tend to marry younger if they marry
someone of the majority group than if they marry a man of their same
group. This is true also for men when the size of the minority group is 0.1.
4. If people marry within their group, age difference at marriage is lower for
people of the minority group. In the particular case that the size of the
minority group is 0.1, women marry older than men.
5. Due to search frictions, the fraction of ever married is lower for the minority
group.
6. The rate of intergroup marriage is always higher for the minority group
(Blau (1977)).3
3.5 Comparison with U.S. Data
In order to compare the model results with US Census data two sources of data
are used. The data on age at first marriage and intergroup marriage from the
1984-88 and 1989-95 Marriage Detail File (MDF) of the U.S. Vital Statistics
Registry.4 Also, data on couples married between 1975 to 1980 from the 1980
Census PUMS 5% file is also used. For the fraction ever married the data is from
the 2000 Census PUMS 5% file.
3For example, Davidson and Widman (2002) find that Catholics are most likely to marry
outside their group when they comprise a relatively small percent of the population in their
dioceses.
4The data on race in the MDF is reported in 35 states.
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3.5.1 Interracial Marriage
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the fraction of white women and white men aged 16-42
who married in 1975-80 (from 1980 Census), 1984-88 and 1989-95 (MDF) who
are in interracial marriages. The pattern in both cases appears to be consistent
with point 1 above (interracial marriage rises with age). In the data, however,
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Figure 3.5: Fraction of white women in interracial marriages by age at first
marriage. 1980 Census, 1984-88 and 1989-95 MDF
For a more detailed comparison between men and women, Figure 3.7 plots the
fraction of interracial marriage of white men and white women from the 1989-95
MDF. The figure shows two characteristics that resemble Figures 3.3 and 3.4 (for
Group 1). First, women tend to engage in more interracial marriage in their 20’s
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Figure 3.6: Fraction of white men in interracial marriages by age at first marriage.
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Figure 3.7: Fraction of white men and women in interracial marriages by age at
first marriage. 1989-95 MDF
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the mid 20’s to the early 30’s.
It can be argued that one cause for people to intermarry more with age could
be that people tend to interact more with people of other races at work after
finishing school. However, it is still surprising that the fraction of interracial
marriage increase even at a higher rate well after the age of 30. Moreover, this
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Less Than High School
Figure 3.8: Fraction of white women in interracial marriages by age at first
marriage and level of education. 1984-88 MDF
The pattern for black men and women for is shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11.
The fraction of interracial marriage of black women appears to increase after
the age of 30 (late 30’s in 1989-95). However, for men the pattern of interracial
marriage does not appear to change over ages. More importantly, the fraction of
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Less Than High School
Figure 3.9: Fraction of white men in interracial marriages by age at first marriage
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Figure 3.10: Fraction of black women in interracial marriages by age at first
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Figure 3.11: Fraction of black men in interracial marriages by age at first mar-
riage. 1980 Census, 1984-88 and 1989-95 MDF
predicts for a minority group5. Notice also that the fraction of intermarriage is
remarkably higher in teenage years, specially for black men.6
3.5.2 Husband with Lower Level of Education (Women "Marrying
Down")
Now we analyze the case where women marry men with lower levels of education.
Hypergamy, or the tendency of women of "marrying up" in education is a fact
well documented by the literature.7 Therefore, in this section we treat having a
husband with lower education as an "intergroup marriage" in terms of the model.
5This issue is analyzed in detail in a recent paper by Wong (2003).
6For a detailed study on the trends in black/white intermarriage see Kalmijn (1993).
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Figure 3.12: Fraction of marriages with wives more educated than husband. 1980
Census and 1984-88 MDF.
That is, as if women have a loss in utility for "marrying down". For the reason
above, it is very difficult to analyze the case for men, so we will restrict this
discussion to the case of women.
Figure 4.4 shows the fraction of white and black women aged 20-42 marrying
men of lower levels of education in 1975-80 (1980 Census) and 1984-88 (MDF)8.
While in the case of whites it appears to slightly increase in their mid 30’s, the
pattern of black women shows an unambiguous increase from age 35 to age 42.
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Age at First Marriage
1980 Census 1984-88 MDF 1989-95 MDF
Same Race Men Women Men Women Men Women
White 24.3 22.4 25.2 23.2 26.0 24.0
Black 25.7 23.6 27.0 25.2 28.1 26.7
Other 27.0 24.4 27.2 24.8 27.8 25.6
Total 24.5 22.5 25.4 23.5 26.2 24.3
Interracial
White 25.2 23.0 26.3 24.0 27.2 24.5
Black 25.9 24.5 26.5 25.3 27.0 26.2
Other 25.3 24.1 26.3 25.1 26.8 25.5
Total 25.4 23.6 26.4 24.5 27.0 25.1
Table 3.3: Age at First Marriage. Men and women marrying people of the same
race and in interracial marriages
3.5.3 Age at First Marriage
This section is devoted to comparing the age at first marriage in different groups
in the data with the analysis of different sizes of groups in Section 3.4.2. Table
3.3 shows the average age at first marriage by race9 for people married in 1975-
80, 1984-88 and 1989-95. A simple inspection to Table 3.3 is enough to show
the consistency of the data with point 2. on page 78: the average age at first
8The information on the level of education of groom and bride in the MDF is reported in
21 states and ends in 1988.
9MDF uses a the traditional definition of race without disclosing people of hispanic descent.
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marriage for whites (majority group) is lower than in the case of blacks and other
races. A closer look over the age at marriage for people in interracial marriages
allows us to illustrate point 3. On average, whites marry in average older if the
spouse is of another race, but the reverse is true for blacks and people of other
races (1984-88 (men) and 1989-95). For the samples in MDF the age difference
at marriage between blacks is remarkably lower than for whites (point 4.).
3.5.4 Size of the Group and Fraction of Ever Married
Size of Ethnic Group by Education (Age 22-40)
White Black Hispanic
Less than High School 38.96 11.02 44.41
High School 66.71 13.81 14.13
Some College 71.52 11.94 10.14
College or More 77.16 6.49 5.69
Total 67.45 11.09 14.44
Fraction of Ever Married (Age 22-40)
White Black Hispanic
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Less than High School 0.66 0.79 0.39 0.42 0.65 0.78
High School 0.68 0.82 0.49 0.49 0.62 0.74
Some College 0.66 0.77 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.70
College or More 0.65 0.70 0.56 0.52 0.61 0.67
Total 0.67 0.77 0.51 0.50 0.63 0.73
Table 3.4: Size of the group and fraction of ever married. US Census 2000
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To complete the comparison of the implications of the model regarding the
size of the groups with the data, we now discuss the fraction of ever married.
The top panel of Table 3.4 shows, by level of education, the relative size of the
population of whites, blacks and Hispanics in the US Census 2000, where we
note the large number of Hispanics among people with less than high school
education. The bottom panel displays the fraction of people ever married, aged
22-40 for the described groups10. Since the ever married rates for blacks are low
in all cases it is difficult to observe any pattern for this group, but the case of
Hispanics deserves consideration. For people with less than high school education
the fraction of ever married Hispanics (44.4% of the people) is very similar to that
for whites (0.65 for men and 0.78 for women). In all other cases the ever married
rate for Hispanics falls short with respect to the fraction for whites (for women
the difference is 8% for high school education and 7% for some college education).
Overall, the marriage rates are always higher for whites (majority group). This
result consistent with point 5. on page 5.
3.6 Different Mortality Rates
As an exercise to capture the effects of different mortality rates on the behavior
of the model, in this last section the model is solved for using mortality rates for
whites (size = 0.9) and blacks. In this example the rate of preference for the
same group (ι) is set in 0.3. Table 3.5 summarize the main results. The model
averages for interracial marriage of whites and rate of ever married is close to
the data (0.72 for men and 0.75 for women versus 0.73 and 0.79 in the data
10The minimum age in this case is 22 years old to avoid including people currently in school










Age at First Marriage 27.6 26.5 26.1 24.1
Sex Ratio of Singles 1.04 1.22
Interracial Marriage 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.022
Ever Married (%) 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.79
Blacks
Size 0.1
Age at First Marriage 30.1 30.0 28.1 26.7
Sex Ratio of Singles 0.903 0.839
Interracial Marriage 0.247 0.238 0.060 0.141
Ever Married (%) 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.59
Table 3.5: Model with mortaility rates of whites (size=0.9) and blacks. Data
















White (US Census 2000)
Black (US Census 2000)
Figure 3.13: Ratio single men/single women. US Census 2000 for blacks and
whites and model using mortality rates for each race
respectively). It also captures the lower marriage rates for blacks (0.63 in the
model versus 0.59 in the data) and the differences in the sex ratio. However, it
does a poor job in predicting the fraction of interracial marriage for blacks (0.24
in the model versus 0.14 for women and only 0.06 for men in the data).
The pattern in the ratio single men/single women over ages is displayed in
Figure 3.13, where the very different behavior of the sex ratio can be appreciated
by simple inspection.
3.7 Summary
The model of this chapter has several predictions that are consistent with some
patterns observed in US data. First, at least for whites (Figures 3.5 and 3.6),
the fraction of interracial marriage appear to increase as people marry older.
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The rationale that this model provides for this fact comes from the preference
of marrying within the group combined with the limited search horizon. As
time passes, reservation values of men and women decrease and so the premium
for marrying within the group. Therefore, people is more willing to propose to
someone from a different group. This is especially true in the case of women,
whose limited fecundity horizon causes the difference in reservation values for
marrying within and outside the group to converge more rapidly than in the case
of the reservation values of men. Since the different fecundity horizon of men
and women affects their willingness to accept potential partners in a different
way through ages, the dynamic of intergroup marriage also differs. As shown
in Figure 3.3, when people prefer to marry within a group (τ > 0) the fraction
of women marrying outside the group increases relatively with respect to the
fraction of men in intermarriage from the late 20’s to near age 40. When people
have no preference about the spouse’s group, the fraction of intermarriage is
constant over ages.
Another regularity found in the data concerns the size of the group and the age
of first marriage. As shown in Table 3.3 for the period 1980-95, ethnic minorities
in the US marry consistently later than the white majority. Moreover, for the
periods 1984-88 and 1989-95, while the average age at first marriage for whites
is higher if they are in an interracial marriage, this is not the case for blacks
and other races. This model is able also to provide an explanation for that. If
people prefer to marry within the group, minority groups will face frictions that
delay the age of marriage. In addition, from the viewpoint of the minority group,
intermarriage will ease the process of finding a mate, even given a within group
preference. But for the majority group, intermarriage means more frictions in
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the search process, and therefore a delay in the age of marriage.
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Chapter 4
Changes on the Sex Ratio, Timing of Marriage and
Spouse Characteristics
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effects of an exogenous change in
the sex ratio over marital behavior of men and women. As a theory background,
the following section uses the two period model of Chapter 2 (considering the sex
ratio as exogenous) and show the effects on the probability of marriage of these
changes. The rest of the chapter is devoted to an empirical analysis over Census
data.
4.1 Comparative Statics: Effects of an Exogenous Change in the Sex
Ratio












Assume S, p and q are exogenous. In this section we analyze the effect of a
change in the sex ratio at age 1 on the reservation values and the probability of
marriage at age 1 for men and women:
4.1.1 Reservation Values
Differentiating Rmold (equation (2.11)) and R
f
old (equation (2.12)) with respect to












































with a positive sign.
The intuition of the signs are straightforward: the higher the sex ratio, women
become choosier and vice-versa for men.
4.1.2 Probability of Marriage
As will be shown below, an exogenous variation in the sex ratio has three different
effects on the probability of marriage (equations (2.7) and (2.9)) in a given period:
1. A direct effect in the availability of mates.
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2. An indirect effect via reservation values of men.
3. An indirect effect via reservation values of women.
Differentiating Φ1 (equation (2.7)) and Γ1 (equation (2.9))with respect to S
















Φ11 = − (1− θ)µSθ−2
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The three coefficients above (equations (4.4) , (4.5) and (4.6)) refer to the
different effects on the probability of marriage for men. The first coefficient (un-
ambiguously < 0) indicates the direct effect of the change in the sex ratio at age 1
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on the probability that a man marries at age 1. Since an increase in the sex ratio
implies a relative scarcity of women, it has a negative effect in the probability of
marriage. The second coefficient reflects the effect in the probability of marriage
via the change in the reservation value of men. Clearly, the negative coefficient
multiplying a negative derivative (see equation(4.1)) indicates that this effect is
positive. The decline in the reservation value of men increases the probability
of marriage. The third coefficient is the indirect effect through the change of
the reservation value of women. As women become choosier the higher the ratio
male/female (by equation(4.2)), this effect is negative for the probability that a
man marries at age 1.
Equations (4.7) , (4.8) and (4.9) show the coefficients for each effect on the
probability of marriage for women. In this case we have that the direct effect
is positive, that is, since there are more men available so the probabilities of
marriage increase for a woman. The second effect is also positive (a negative
coefficient multiplying a negative derivative), and reflect the declining on the
reservation value of men when the sex ratio increases. The third effect is the one
related to the change in the reservation value for women, and will be the only
with negative sign.
For both men and women, the net effect of a change of the sex ratio on the
probability of marriage is ambiguous, depending on the magnitude of the three
effects mentioned above. The empirical analysis of the following sections is an
attempt to explore further the interaction of these effects.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
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The data used in this chapter come from the 1970 and 1980 Census IPUMS files.
Combining the two samples of 1970 Form 1 (Metro and State), we have a 2%
sample of the population in 1970, the 1980 IPUMS file is a 5 % sample. With
this files three samples are constructed in the following way:
1. A sample of men and women who were in the 1970 Census and were single
in 1965 or were in the 1980 Census and were single in 1975. This sam-
ple contains observations on men and women age 21-35 in 1970 and 1980.
Therefore we have a sample of people who had never married and were aged
16-30 in 1965 or 1975.
2. A sub-sample women, from the above group who were in their first marriage
at the time of the survey married between 1965 and 1970 or 1975-1980. Us-
ing the Spousal links provided by the IPUMS file, these women are matched
with their husbands. The age range for husbands is 16-50.
3. A sub-sample of men who were in their first marriage at the time of the
survey but also had not previously married 5 years prior to the survey. As
before, the spousal links were used to match wives to their husbands for
this group of men. Wives were aged 16-50.
These two last samples allow constructing outcome variables that reflect the
marriage characteristics for the selected groups of men and women: differences in
education level, race, etc., between spouses. For the purpose of estimation, the
pooled samples are weighted by the relative size of the Census samples.
Descriptive statistics for Black, Hispanic and the whole sample are shown in
Tables 4.1- 4.6. Sex Ratios by Race and education level are shown in Table 4.1
and the relative size of the different ethnic/educational group in Table 4.2.The
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level of the sex ratio vary considerably by race and education. For example, for
low-education whites the ratio is very high (1.77 in 1975), and the opposite is
true for blacks. Blacks particularly with college education have a low sex ratio
demonstrating the shortage of black men that rises with education, fact exten-
sively discussed in previous research. Table 4.3 shows a much lower marriage
rates for Black over the 5 year period previous to the Census. This fact has been
extensively discussed in previous literature (Wilson 1987; Wood 1993; Barber
2001). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the fraction of marriage with education differ-
entials between spouses both for sample if married women and for the sample
of married men. In both samples, near one half of the couples have the same
education level. Finally, table 4.6 shows the proportions of interracial marriages
for both the sample of men and the sample of women.
4.3 Empirical Framework
The strategy is to capture the effects differential sex ratios faced by men and
women when they are unmarried 5 years prior to the census. Since the way
the local marriage market is defined in this paper, the identification of the model
comes from spatial variation within the same race/education cell. The estimating
equation for individual i in ethnic group j , education level k and living in State
s is:
Yi = θY ear+αsStates+βkEduck+γjRacej+δgAgeg+ Sizeskj+µRatioskj+ i
(4.10)
where θ is a year fixed effect (1970 or 1980), αs is a state fixed effect, βk an
educational level effect, γj a race effect, δg an age effect, Sizeskj is the relative
size of the ethnic educational group within the state s and Ratioskj is the Sex
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Ratio of race j and educational level k in state s at the beginning of the period.
The list of dependent variables denoted Yi will be a latent index, such be the case
of several demographic discrete choice outcomes like marital status, interracial
marriage, etc.
Here the two variables of interest are the ones regarding the size of the group
and the sex ratio. The variable Sizeskj is the fraction of the population of the
same race and education level in a given state. The variable Ratioskj is the ratio
of the number of single men aged 16-30 in 1965 or 1975 to the number of single
women of the same age group, by race, educational level and state. Since the
samples contain observations for people who were never married in 1965, in one
case, and 1975, in the other, this ratio is an approximation of the "virtual sex
ratio" in 1965 and 1975 respectively. The meaning of "virtual" is that the ratio
is calculated only for available men and women at that date. The structure of the
data make impossible to include divorced people in those years.
The simultaneous effects of these two variables on marital behavior can help
in the analysis of assortative mating. First, sex imbalances in a given group can
affect timing of marriage and also who to marry. Second, as largely discussed
in the previous chapter, the behavior can be also affected by the search friction
generated by a relative small size of the group in the population.
Through all previous chapters the sex ratio has been treated as endogenous.
However, from the perspective of an individual the sex ratio can be viewed as ex-
ogenous. That is, past decisions of other people determine the sex ratio a specific
individual faces but those decisions are beyond the control of that individual. A
specific individual must act in the marriage market taken the sex ratio he or she
faces as given. With this framework, the sex ratios are calculated in certain point
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of time (the starting points in this case are 1965 and 1975) and the dependent
variables would be a "flow" of decision outcomes on a period of time (1965-70 or
1975-80).
Even though the way that the sample was constructed allows avoiding a great
part of the risk of endogeneity of the explanatory variable, there is still a po-
tential problem of "Sample Selection Bias". Taking for example, the sample of
people who were single in 1975, the sample omit observations on people married
before 1975. Because less educated people and people living in the South and the
Midwest tend to marry earlier, those groups are underrepresented in the sample.
Unfortunately, is impossible to apply the known procedures to correct for this
problem because, in general, the variables that could explain the presence of the
observation in the sample are the same ones that explain the outcome variable,
the propensity to marry.
Another problem of sample selection may arise in the samples of married
women and married men. Since the census show only current marital status,
the sample will drop the couples married during the period 5 year prior to the
census but divorced before the Census. If there is any degree of correlation
between divorce and intergroup marriage this could cause a misrepresentation of
the fraction of this kind of marriage in the samples. However, more than 90% of
marriages that occur in the 5 year prior to the census are intact at the census.
This selection problem should be small.
The empirical study is divided in two parts: First, we study the effects of a
variation in the local sex ratio and the size of the ethnic/educational group on the
timing of marriage, using the "general sample" described above and estimating a
separate equation for men and women. Second, we analyze the consequences of
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variation in the sex ratio and size on "spouse’s characteristics" for the sample of
people who choose to marry in the period 5 year previous to the census. In all
cases the equations were estimated using probit models.
4.4 Basic Results
4.4.1 Probability of Marriage
The first part of the empirical study analyses is with respect to the likelihood of
first marriage between 1965 and 1970 or between 1975 and 1980. One of our main
questions of interest is how the sex ratio affects the propensity to marry differently
at different ages. We modify equation (4.10) adding interactions between age and
sex ratio to capture this, in the following way:
Yi = θY ear + αsStates + βkEduck + γjRacej + Sizeskj + (4.11)
δgAgeg + µRatioskj + ξgAgeg ∗Ratioskj + i
where the dependent variable is = 1 if the person was ever married by 1970 or
1980.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the results for women and men without year fixed
effects and Tables 4.9 and 4.10 display the probit coefficients adding census year
fixed effects. The significant coefficients in the model with fixed effects are in
similar to those in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 but the standard deviations are in general
smaller.
Table 4.9 shows the marginal effects from the probit model for women single
in 1965 or 1975 for four different samples (4.11). The first column of Table 4.9
presents estimates for the whole sample, column (2) presents estimates for the
101
sample of black women, column (3) presents estimates for a sample of college
graduates aged 22-25 in 1965 or 1975 and column (4) presents estimates for
the sample of high school graduates aged 16-19 in 1965 or 1975.The effect of a
change in the size of the group is small but significantly negative for the whole
sample (-0.062) and bigger for High School graduates (-0.21). In the case of
College graduates the effect is reversed: an increase of the size of the ethnic and
educational group by 0.1 implies an increase in the probability of marriage in the
next five years by 0.06. This last result is in line with the implication of the model
of the previous chapter, in the sense that a decrease in search friction leads to an
increase in the probability of marriage in the current period. An explanation of
the results in the other two cases could be that the increase in reservation values
that come with a bigger size more than neutralize the effect of the decrease in
search friction. Moreover, it seems reasonable that the effect of a decrease in
friction is more important for a smaller group than for the whole sample.
To analyze the effects of a change in the sex ratio, we look first at the results
for the whole sample (column (1)) of Table 4.9. The coefficient on "Sex Ratio",
applies to all age groups but specifically address the effect on the youngest age
group. This implies that for women aged 16-17 in 1965 or 1975 the effect of sex
ratio on marriage is positive (0.1). The coefficient suggests that an increase in
the sex ratio by 25% implies an increase in the probability of marriage in the next
5 years by 2.5%. The interactions between age group and sex ratio then estimate
the difference between the overall effect and the effect of a specific age group.
For example from ages 26 to 30 the coefficient is around -0.2, which implies that
the net effect of this is -0.1. This means that in this age range if the sex ratio
increases by 25%, the probability of marriage in the next five years decreases by
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2.5%. This result, at odds with the literature,1 indicates that an adverse change
in the market conditions can make women tend to marry faster, at least at older
ages.
The comparative statics of Section 4.1.2 can help us to explain why. Provided
a decrease in the sex ratio, both the direct effect (availability of males) and one
of the indirect effects (higher reservation values of men) act together lowering
women’s probability of marriage. The third effect (indirect effect via lower reser-
vation values of women) is the only that may act in the reverse direction, that is,
increasing the probability of marriage when the sex ratio decreases. Therefore,
the explanation of the negative coefficient (age 18 and beyond) could be that the
third effect more than compensate the other two.
The second column of Table 4.9 repeat the analysis for a sample of black
women. The net coefficient is positive for age 16-17 (0.2) and 18-19 (0.068) and
then turns negative to reach a net effect of -0.18 at age 26-27. In the case of
college graduates (column (3)) the only significative coefficient is at age 24-25
(-0.08) and for high school graduates (column (4)) the coefficient is 0.2 at age
16-17 and 0.14 at 19-20.
Table 4.10 shows a similar analysis for males. The coefficient for size is sig-
nificant and negative for the while sample (-0.044) and significant and positive
for blacks (0.234). Again, the effect of a decrease in friction appear to be more
important in a minority group than in the whole sample.
Not surprisingly, the effects of a change in the sex ratio for men are in line
with the results for women. The first column of Table 4.10 shows that the net
coefficients for a change in the sex ratio are positive for ages 16-17 (0.1) and 18-19
1See for example Brien (1997)
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(0.06) but turns negative from age 22-23 and beyond. In this case, there are two
effects that explain the negative coefficients: if the sex ratio increases, both the
lower availability of males and the higher reservation values of women appear to
be more important than the reduction in the reservation values of men.
In the case of black men (column (2)) the coefficient are significantly negative
from age 22-23, but less important in magnitude than the results for black women.
It is widely recognized that when men become in short supply (reducing the
sex ratio) this changes the "terms of trade" inducing women to change their
optimal time at marriage. The "terms of trade" argument alone would suggest
that the same forces that delay marriage for women when men are in short supply
make men marry earlier. However, the mechanisms discussed above help to
"coordinate the market".
4.4.2 Spouse’s Characteristics
This part of the study consists in the probit estimation of equation (4.10) to
a selected set of outcome variables that represent intergroup marriage for both
the sample of married women and the sample of married men. These outcome
variables are binary variables for interracial marriage, for spouse with same, lower
or higher level of education, for spouse previously married and for spouse with
own children.
Panel (a) of Table 4.11 shows the result of the estimation of the different
outcome variables for the sample of married women and Panel (b) for a sub-
sample of black women. For interracial marriage the only significant coefficient
is the one relative to the size of the group for the whole sample. In this case,
an increase of the size of the group by 0.1 implies a decrease in the fraction of
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interracial marriage of a 0.02.
The coefficient for having a husband with the same level of education (that
can be considered a "good") are, not surprisingly, significantly positive for both
size and sex ratio in the whole sample (0.2 and 0.6 respectively) and also in the
sample of black women (2.3 and 0.105). The interpretation of these coefficients
are straightforward: the probability that a woman marries a man with the same
level of education depends positively on the fraction of the people with the same
level of education in the population and in the relative availability of males within
that group. The case of husbands with more education ("marrying up") is similar
than the previous case but the coefficients are bigger in all cases. For husbands
with less education ("marrying down") the sign of the coefficient is positive and
very high in all cases. In the case of size the coefficient is close to -1 for the whole
sample and around -2.5 for blacks. The effect of an decrease in the sex ratio by
0.10 implies an increase in the probability of marrying someone less educated by
0.03 in the whole sample and by 0.06 in the case of blacks.
For the case of husband previously married the coefficient of size is significant
and negative (-0.08) and for husband with children the significant coefficient is
the one for sex ratio (-0.05) in both cases for the whole sample. There’s no
coefficient significantly different from 0 in the sub-sample of black women for this
two variables.
Table 4.12 shows the results of the same analysis for the sample of married
men. In the case of interracial marriage the coefficients for the whole sample
(Panel (a)) and for a sub-sample of black men (Panel (b)) have different sign.
The coefficient of the variable size is negative for the whole sample (-0.1) and
in the case of black men an increase in the size of the group implies a higher
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probability of interracial marriage (0.52). The coefficient of sex ratio is only
significant for the whole sample, but very low (0.006).
The different outcome variables of education don’t show discrepancies be-
tween blacks and the whole sample. The probability of marrying someone of the
same education level depend positively on the size of the group (1.1 for the whole
sample and 3.02 for blacks) and negatively on the sex ratio (a lower sex ratio
means relatively that women are relatively abundant). In the case of a wife with
less education the result are somewhat surprising: in both cases depend nega-
tively on the size of the group (-1.5 for the whole sample and -4.07 for blacks)
but also are negative on the sex ratio (-0.34 and -0.2 respectively). For wives
with more education a the results are similar: all the coefficients are positive.
Finally, the variable wife previously married shows a negative coefficient for
size (-0.066) and a positive for the sex ratio (0.015) and wife with children shows
reverse sign, only for the whole sample. As in the case of the sample of women,
there is no significant coefficients in the sample of black men in these two variables.
4.5 Summary
The results of the empirical study of this chapter are generally consistent with
the models of the previous chapters. The results of Section 4.4.1 suggest that
the behavior of men and women respect to the timing of marriage is not driven
only by the direct effect of the availability of partners but also by the reaction of
the rest of the market to a given sex imbalance. Moreover, this behavior is not
constant over time and may change over ages, as largely discussed in Chapter 2.
The main result in this section is that an adverse change in the sex ratio may
increase the probability of marriage of women. To the best of my knowledge, this
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is the first empirical work with these findings, especially given that most of the
literature has focused on analyzing only the direct effect of mate availability.
The findings of Section 4.4.2 are consistent with the model of Chapter 3: the
probability that people marry outside their own group increases when there is an
adverse sex imbalance in their group or when the size of their own group is small
enough to produce frictions that compensate for the benefits of marrying within
their group.
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Table 4.1: Means of Sex ratios by race and education
Descriptive Statistics - Sex Ratios by Race and Education
Less Than HS High School Some College College Total
Single in 1965
White 1.741 1.001 1.320 1.429 1.276
Black 1.141 0.908 0.980 0.801 0.997
Hispanic 1.334 0.951 1.269 1.298 1.168
Total 1.541 0.986 1.296 1.398 1.236
Single in 1975
White 1.776 1.221 1.172 1.226 1.263
Black 1.134 0.968 0.840 0.745 0.953
Hispanic 1.341 1.134 1.187 1.327 1.235
Total 1.547 1.179 1.133 1.198 1.219
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Table 4.2: Relative Size of the group by Race and Education
Descriptive Statistics - Relative Size by Race and Education
Less Than HS High School Some College College Total
Single in 1965
White 0.112 0.311 0.192 0.161 0.777
Black 0.042 0.045 0.015 0.007 0.109
Hispanic 0.035 0.045 0.021 0.013 0.114
Total 0.189 0.401 0.229 0.182 1.000
Single in 1975
White 0.079 0.300 0.229 0.197 0.805
Black 0.033 0.055 0.034 0.014 0.137
Hispanic 0.020 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.058
Total 0.133 0.375 0.276 0.217 1.000
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Table 4.3: Fraction of People Married the next 5 Years. People never married by
1965 or 1975.
Descriptive Statistics - Married in the Next 5 years
White Black Hispanic
Age in 1965 or 1975 Male Female Male Female Male Female
16 0.274 0.466 0.208 0.320 0.353 0.547
17 0.381 0.567 0.294 0.390 0.459 0.633
18 0.481 0.631 0.357 0.420 0.534 0.673
19 0.536 0.642 0.440 0.435 0.586 0.673
20 0.578 0.647 0.464 0.439 0.625 0.680
21 0.607 0.645 0.499 0.432 0.631 0.640
22 0.613 0.626 0.496 0.414 0.653 0.637
23 0.603 0.586 0.497 0.390 0.631 0.599
24 0.583 0.541 0.493 0.362 0.610 0.553
25 0.557 0.494 0.460 0.340 0.570 0.520
26 0.532 0.457 0.471 0.344 0.583 0.511
27 0.502 0.423 0.443 0.324 0.556 0.472
28 0.479 0.373 0.429 0.294 0.517 0.428
29 0.447 0.354 0.419 0.263 0.473 0.391
30 0.409 0.325 0.376 0.261 0.475 0.384
Total 0.493 0.571 0.400 0.384 0.541 0.609
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Table 4.4: Fraction of marriages with education differentials. Women married
between 1965 and 1970 or between 1975 and 1980.
Descriptive Statistics- Sample of Wives
Husband with Less Education
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.214 0.257 0.221 0.218
18-19 0.244 0.294 0.252 0.248
20-21 0.246 0.315 0.267 0.253
22-23 0.252 0.321 0.262 0.259
24-25 0.251 0.303 0.238 0.256
26-27 0.253 0.325 0.219 0.259
28-30 0.254 0.312 0.211 0.256
Total 0.238 0.295 0.243 0.243
Husband with More Education
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.281 0.231 0.286 0.278
18-19 0.264 0.219 0.251 0.260
20-21 0.258 0.208 0.258 0.254
22-23 0.232 0.224 0.250 0.233
24-25 0.233 0.222 0.261 0.234
26-27 0.241 0.235 0.277 0.244
28-30 0.255 0.232 0.255 0.252
Total 0.261 0.222 0.265 0.259
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Table 4.5: Fraction of marriages with education differentials. Men married be-
tween 1965 and 1970 or between 1975 and 1980.
Descriptive Statistics - Sample of Husbands
Wife with More Education
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.236 0.302 0.255 0.243
18-19 0.201 0.288 0.222 0.209
20-21 0.185 0.279 0.228 0.196
22-23 0.175 0.280 0.219 0.187
24-25 0.170 0.286 0.233 0.186
26-27 0.163 0.277 0.226 0.180
28-30 0.172 0.292 0.213 0.190
Total 0.190 0.285 0.228 0.201
Wife with Less Education
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.252 0.193 0.241 0.247
18-19 0.293 0.212 0.263 0.284
20-21 0.320 0.222 0.279 0.308
22-23 0.344 0.245 0.299 0.332
24-25 0.355 0.242 0.277 0.338
26-27 0.361 0.252 0.279 0.342
28-30 0.353 0.223 0.251 0.328
Total 0.317 0.226 0.271 0.306
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Table 4.6: Fraction of Men and Women with Interracial Marriages. People mar-
ried between 1965 and 1970 or between 1975 and 1980.
Descriptive Statistics - Interracial Marriage
Women Single in 1965 or 1975
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.051 0.142 0.389 0.094
18-19 0.049 0.122 0.382 0.086
20-21 0.046 0.117 0.386 0.082
22-23 0.045 0.110 0.375 0.081
24-25 0.047 0.106 0.358 0.086
26-27 0.047 0.106 0.331 0.087
28-30 0.051 0.120 0.359 0.102
Total 0.048 0.122 0.380 0.087
Men Single in 1965 or 1975
Age in 1965 or 1975 White Black Hispanic Total
16-17 0.085 0.289 0.401 0.131
18-19 0.068 0.184 0.348 0.100
20-21 0.063 0.162 0.351 0.094
22-23 0.060 0.156 0.346 0.090
24-25 0.057 0.143 0.325 0.087
26-27 0.062 0.170 0.311 0.096
28-30 0.065 0.161 0.297 0.099
Total 0.066 0.177 0.348 0.099
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Table 4.7: Marginal probit effects of a change in the sex ratio and in the size of
the group to the likelihood of first marriage between 1965 and 1970 or 1975-80.
Marry in the Next 5 Years - Female
Whole Sample Black College High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.206 -1.28 -1.555 -0.209
(0.014)** (0.103)** (0.171)** (0.038)**
Sex Ratio 0.068 0.202 0.212 0.199
(0.006)** (0.020)** (0.029)** (0.019)**
(age=18-19)*Sex Ratio -0.1 -0.127 -0.056
(0.007)** (0.026)** (0.016)**
(age=20-21)*Sex Ratio -0.099 -0.246
(0.008)** (0.027)**
(age=22-23)*Sex Ratio -0.087 -0.367
(0.010)** (0.031)**
(age=24-25)*Sex Ratio -0.128 -0.287 -0.076
(0.012)** (0.036)** (0.028)**
(age=26-27)*Sex Ratio -0.183 -0.357
(0.014)** (0.046)**
(age=28-30)*Sex Ratio -0.182 -0.252
(0.014)** (0.045)**
Observations 496,093 71,565 28,106 126,828
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.8: Marginal probit effects of a change in the sex ratio and in the size of
the group to the likelihood of first marriage between 1965 and 1970 or 1975-80.
Marry in the Next 5 Years - Male
Whole Sample Black College High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.188 -0.806 -2.96 0.076
(0.013)** (0.107)** (0.136)** (0.043)
Sex Ratio 0.075 0.043 0.091 0.036
(0.005)** (0.016)** (0.019)** (0.014)*
(age=18-19)*Sex Ratio -0.029 0.018 0.023
(0.006)** (0.019) (0.014)
(age=20-21)*Sex Ratio -0.075 -0.015
(0.007)** (0.019)
(age=22-23)*Sex Ratio -0.093 -0.042
(0.008)** (0.022)
(age=24-25)*Sex Ratio -0.135 -0.111 -0.031
(0.009)** (0.024)** (0.023)
(age=26-27)*Sex Ratio -0.153 -0.069
(0.011)** (0.037)
(age=28-30)*Sex Ratio -0.174 -0.101
(0.011)** (0.032)**
Observations 593,672 67,454 40,578 120,741
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.9: Marginal probit effects of a change in the sex ratio and in the size of
the group to the likelihood of first marriage between 1965 and 1970 or 1975-80.
Census year fixed effects.
Marry in the Next 5 Years - Female (Year Fixed Effects)
Whole Sample Black College High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.062 0.027 0.625 -0.209
(0.014)** (0.107) (0.208)** (0.038)**
Sex Ratio 0.1 0.2 0.019 0.199
(0.006)** (0.020)** (0.029) (0.019)**
(age=18-19)*Sex Ratio -0.117 -0.132 -0.056
(0.007)** (0.026)** (0.016)**
(age=20-21)*Sex Ratio -0.13 -0.266
(0.008)** (0.028)**
(age=22-23)*Sex Ratio -0.123 -0.396
(0.010)** (0.032)**
(age=24-25)*Sex Ratio -0.159 -0.333 -0.082
(0.012)** (0.037)** (0.029)**
(age=26-27)*Sex Ratio -0.206 -0.378
(0.014)** (0.046)**
(age=28-30)*Sex Ratio -0.197 -0.287
(0.014)** (0.045)**
Observations 496,093 71,565 28,106 126,828
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.10: Marginal probit effects of a change in the sex ratio and in the size of
the group to the likelihood of first marriage between 1965 and 1970 or 1975-80.
Census year fixed effects.
Marry in the Next 5 Years - Male (Year Fixed Effects)
Whole Sample Black College High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.044 0.234 0.338 0.076
(0.013)** (0.110)* (0.186) (0.043)
Sex Ratio 0.099 0.025 -0.022 0.036
(0.005)** (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)*
(age=18-19)*Sex Ratio -0.042 0.017 0.023
(0.006)** (0.019) (0.014)
(age=20-21)*Sex Ratio -0.107 -0.026
(0.007)** (0.019)
(age=22-23)*Sex Ratio -0.136 -0.057
(0.008)** (0.022)**
(age=24-25)*Sex Ratio -0.179 -0.132 -0.036
(0.009)** (0.024)** (0.023)
(age=26-27)*Sex Ratio -0.197 -0.092
(0.011)** (0.037)*
(age=28-30)*Sex Ratio -0.211 -0.126
(0.011)** (0.032)**
Observations 593,672 67,454 40,578 120,741
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.11: Marginal Probit effects of a change of the Sex Ratio on husbands’
characteristics. Women married the first time between 1965-70 or 1975-80.
Spouse’s Characteristics - Sample of Wives (Year Fixed Effects)
Whole Sample Black
(a) (b)
Dependent Variable Size Sex Ratio Size Sex Ratio
Husband of Different Race -0.178 0.002 0.025 0.025
(0.011)** (0.003) (0.159) (0.015)
Husband with Same Education 0.194 0.056 2.299 0.105
(0.012)** (0.005)** (0.161)** (0.020)**
Husband with Less Education -0.982 -0.336 -2.527 -0.59
(0.015)** (0.005)** (0.148)** (0.021)**
Husband with More Education 0.452 0.175 1.241 0.394
(0.015)** (0.005)** (0.143)** (0.016)**
Husband Previously Married -0.077 0.006 0.13 -0.006
(0.012)** (0.004) (0.146) (0.016)
Husband with Own Children -0.006 -0.048 0.165 -0.022
(0.021) (0.007)** (0.228) (0.023)
Observations 251,660 19,546
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4.12: Marginal Probit effects of a change of the Sex Ratio on wives’ char-
acteristics. Men married the first time between 1965-70 or 1975-80.
Spouse’s Characteristics - Sample of Husbands (Year Fixed Effects)
Whole Sample Black
(a) (b)
Dependent Variable Size Sex Ratio Size Sex Ratio
Wife of Different Race -0.1 0.006 0.521 -0.018
(0.011)** (0.003)* (0.157)** (0.014)
Wife with Same Education 1.109 -0.067 3.022 -0.244
(0.017)** (0.005)** (0.143)** (0.018)**
Wife with Less Education -1.523 -0.336 -4.074 -0.209
(0.016)** (0.005)** (0.115)** (0.013)**
Wife with More Education 0.295 0.327 1.763 0.427
(0.013)** (0.004)** (0.138)** (0.015)**
Wife Previously Married -0.067 0.015 -0.086 0.003
(0.012)** (0.003)** (0.108) (0.011)
Wife with Own Children 0.07 -0.043 0.304 -0.024
(0.021)** (0.006)** (0.192) (0.019)
Observations 247,823 20,880
Standard errors in parentheses




The model developed in Chapter 2 that asymmetric fecundity horizons between
men and women alone are sufficient to generate a stylized fact that holds across
many societies — on average younger women marry older men. The 2-parameter
model developed to address this fact also accounts for other stylized facts about
the marriage market. The contribution of this paper is to provide a framework
where age of marriage is determined by biological concerns, ignoring potential
gains of specialization. In the last few decades, men and women have become
more alike in their social roles. Female labor force participation has increased
dramatically in many societies and differences in education level are disappearing
in more developed countries. The model fits the data well for recent decades in
the United States, France and Sweden. A second contribution of this work is to
show how the effect of asymmetries in mortality between men and women can
affect the structure of the marriage markets. This plays a particularly important
role for Black Americans.
Countries with advanced post-industrial demographics (e.g. France, Sweden
and the U.S.) have ages at first marriage and an age pattern of sex ratios that
closely resemble the model’s predictions. In developing countries, however, where
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traditional gender roles are still important the model predictions fail to explain
the patterns in the data. This failure suggests that in these contexts the model
is incomplete.
The model of Chapter 3 has several implications that appear to be consistent
with US data. First it suggests that the fraction of intermarriage increases with
age. This fact is an empirical regularity for interracial marriage of whites in the
US, at least from 1975 to 1995. For blacks, however, data does not show a similar
increasing pattern in interracial marriage. However, the data on women marrying
lower educated men does indeed shows this patter for African- American women
married during their 30’s. The second implication of the model is that, due to
increasing search frictions, the smaller the size of the group, the higher the rate of
intermarriage, the lower the marriage rate and the older the age of marriage. Here
even qualitative consistent, the model predicts a much a higher rate of interracial
marriage for African-Americans than the pattern observed in the data.
Now that we have a better understanding of the role of biology, one natural
extension of this work is to incorporate features of the labor market that do vary
across countries and over time. Of particular importance are both the earnings
ability of men in a society and the relative earnings ability of men versus women.
This model is designed to incorporate these extensions.
The results of the empirical study of Chapter 4 suggest that a shortage of
single men leads women (and also men) to marry earlier. This result suggests
that the behavior of men and women respect to the timing of marriage is not
driven only by the direct effect of the availability of partners but also by the
reaction of the rest of the market to a given sex imbalance. In addition, the
result may imply a more elastic response for women to a tight marriage market
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than the one for men. This is consistent with a marriage model where the search
horizon for women is shorter than the one for men, as the one developed in the
previous chapters. The results also suggest that an adverse change in the sex
ratio or a relatively small size of their ethnic/educational group, in line with




Complete Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
A.1 Existence
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is a fixed point.
Lets define a compact setX = [0, xmax]×[0, ymax]×[0,m1]×[0, f1] .The next
step is to show that T (.) is continuous and maps from X to itself. Lets pick the
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= 1 and 0 < β < 1. Also, by condition (k1)
kx < xmax. Therefore, T10 ∈ [0, xmax] .
Similar is the case of T20. Since 0.5 < m1m1+m20 < 1, k > 1 and 0 ≤ Gf (R
m
old0) ≤
1, it is clear that T20 ∈ [0, ymax]



















is clearly between 0 and





is also between 0 and 1.
Thereforem2 must belong to the interval [0,m1] . Similar explanation can be used
to justify that T40 (Rmold0, R
m
old0,m20,f20) ∈ [0, f1] .
The continuity of T (.) is ensured given the boundaries given to the ratio single






A.2 Uniqueness in the Equilibrium Strategies
















βηf (1− qGf (Rmold)) y
k
(A.2)
By definition, p ∈ [0.5, 1] and q ∈ [0.5, 1]. Differentiating (A.1) and (A.2) we




















Now, using the condition in (2.5), it is easy to show that the intercepts are





T1 (ymax) = (1− p) ηmβx ≥ 0
T2(xmax) =
βηf (1− q) y
k
≥ 0
The above conditions, summarized in the figure, rule out any corner solution
and at the same time guarantee the existence of at least one interior solution.
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H (Rmold) = η
mβ [(1− p) + kp (1−Gm (T2 (Rmold)))]x
To ensure uniqueness, we need a fixed point of H (.). Thus, we need to show
that H (Rmold) is a contraction mapping. that is
kH (Rmold)−H (Rmold) k ≤ ∂kRmold −Rmoldk
where 0 < δ < 1
To show that H is a contraction mapping, it is enough to prove that
H 0 (Rmold) ≤ δ < 1 ∀Rmold ∈ [0, xmax]
But









Using (2.2) , (2.3) (2.4) , (A.3) , (A.4)and the assumption that m1 = f1, sub-
stituting in (A.5) and manipulating, we get
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≤ 1, that m1
M
≤ 1 and that β < 1.
Hence, it will be sufficient for H 0 (Rmold) to be a contraction mapping if we have
gf (R
m








Therefore, we have that
H 0 (Rmold) < 1
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By the assumption above, Gf (.) = Gm (.) . First, by (2.11) and (2.12), and using
(2.2) , (2.3) and (2.4) , we define the difference between reservation values of men




























(m1 (1−Gf (Rmold)) +m2 − f2)
k2(1 + β)M
For k = 1, we know that men and women face exactly the same problem.












Hence, Rm > Rf if k > 1, which completes the proof.
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